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Abstract
In their article ‘Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes’,
Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl draw upon structural equation models to develop an
attractive analysis of ‘actual cause’. Their analysis is designed for the case of
deterministic causation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an
elegant treatment of probabilistic causation.
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1 Introduction
The investigation of actual (or ‘token’) causal relations—in addition to the investigation of
generic (or ‘type’) causal relations—is an important part of scientific practice. For example,
on various occasions in the history of science, paleontologists and geologists have been
interested in determining the actual cause or causes of the extinction of the dinosaurs,
cosmologists with the actual cause of the Cosmic Microwave Background, astronomers with
the actual causes of the perturbation of the orbit of Uranus and the perihelion precession of
Mercury, and epidemiologists with the actual cause of the outbreak of the H7N9 avian
influenza virus. Yet, despite the scientific importance of the discovery of actual causes, there
remains a significant amount of philosophical work to be done before we have a satisfactory
understanding of the nature of actual causation.
Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) have made progress on this front. They draw upon
structural equation models (SEMs) to provide an innovative and attractive analysis (or
‘definition’, as they call it) of actual causation. Their analysis1 is closely related to analyses
proposed by Pearl ([2009], Ch. 10),2 Hitchcock ([2001a], pp. 286–7, 289–90), and Woodward
1There is a minor difference between the analysis offered in (Halpern and Pearl [2001],
esp. pp. 196–7) and that offered in (Halpern and Pearl [2005], esp. p. 853), which I will return
to in Section 4 below. In the meantime, I shall talk as though Halpern and Pearl ([2001],
[2005]) offer just a single analysis.
2The analysis given in (Pearl [2009], Ch. 10) was first published in (Pearl [2000], Ch.10).
Pearl ([2009], pp. 329–30) takes the analysis of Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) to be a
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([2005], pp. 74–86). Halpern and Pearl’s analysis handles certain cases that are
counterexamples to these closely related accounts (see Pearl [2009], pp. 329–30; Weslake
[forthcoming], Section 2), as well as handling well many cases that pose problems for more
traditional, non-structural equation based, analyses of actual causation (Halpern and Pearl
[2001], pp. 197–202; Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 856–69).
One limitation of Halpern and Pearl’s analysis and related accounts is that they are designed
for the case of deterministic causation (see Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 852; Hitchcock
[2007], p. 498; Pearl [2009], p. 26). An extension of their analysis to enable it to handle
probabilistic actual causation would be worthwhile, particularly in light of the probabilistic
nature of many widely accepted scientific theories. In the following, I propose such an
extension.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that a refinement to Halpern and Pearl’s analysis has
been proposed by Halpern ([2008], pp. 200–5), Halpern and Hitchcock ([2010], pp. 389–94,
400–3), and Halpern and Hitchcock ([forthcoming], Section 6). The refined account preserves
the core of Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis, but tweaks it slightly by strengthening one of
its conditions so as to rule out certain alleged non-causes that are counted as actual causes by
Halpern and Pearl’s analysis.3 However doubt has been cast by Halpern ([unpublished],
Section 1) and by Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming], esp. Section 3) upon whether this
refinement to Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis is necessary (i.e. whether the alleged
counterexamples to Halpern and Pearl’s analysis are genuine).4 I will therefore take Halpern
and Pearl’s analysis as my starting point in attempting to develop an analysis of actual
causation adequate to the probabilistic case. As I shall explain in Section 5 below, if the
refinement of, and improvement upon, that published in (Pearl [2000], [2009]): he points out
that the analysis of Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) handles cases that are counterexamples
to the analysis of Pearl ([2000], [2009]).
3The refined account, like Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis, incorporates the
assumption of determinism (Halpern and Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 2).
4Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming]) additionally argue that the refinement is
problematic, and in any case doesn’t achieve its desired upshot.
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proposed refinement to Halpern and Pearl’s analysis is necessary, it is plausible that it can be
incorporated into my proposed analysis of probabilistic causation too.
The road map is as follows. In Section 2, I give an example of (deterministic) preemption,
which poses problems for many traditional attempts to analyse actual causation in terms of
counterfactuals (and, indeed, in terms of regularities and causal processes). In Section 3, I
introduce the notion of a structural equation model (SEM). In Section 4, I outline Halpern and
Pearl’s analysis of ‘actual cause’, which appeals to SEMs. In Section 5, I show that Halpern
and Pearl’s analysis provides an attractive treatment of deterministic preemption. In Section 6,
I describe an example of probabilistic preemption, which Halpern and Pearl’s analysis can’t
(and wasn’t designed to) handle. In Section 7, I outline the notion of a probabilistic causal
model. In Section 8, I draw upon the notion of a probabilistic causal model in proposing an
extension of Halpern and Pearl’s analysis of ‘actual cause’ to the probabilistic case. I show
that this extension yields an elegant treatment of probabilistic preemption. In Section 9, I
outline an alternative attempt to extend analyses of actual causation in terms of SEMs to the
probabilistic case, due to Twardy and Korb ([2011]). In Section 10, I show that Twardy and
Korb’s proposal is subject to counterexamples which mine avoids. Section 11 concludes.
2 Preemption
Preemption makes trouble for attempts to analyse causation in terms of counterfactual
dependence. Here’s an example.
PE: The New York Police Department is due to go on parade at the parade ground
on Saturday. Knowing this, Don Corleone decides that, when Saturday comes, he
will order Sonny to go to the parade ground and shoot and kill Police Chief
McCluskey. Not knowing Corleone’s plan, Don Barzini decides that, when
Saturday comes, he will order Turk to shoot and kill McCluskey. Turk is perfectly
obedient and an impeccable shot: if he gets the chance, he will shoot and kill
McCluskey. Nevertheless, Corleone’s headquarters are closer to the police parade
ground than Barzini’s headquarters, so, if both Sonny and Turk receive their
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orders, then Sonny will arrive at the parade ground first, shooting and killing
McCluskey before Turk gets the chance. Indeed, even if Sonny were to shoot and
miss, McCluskey would be whisked away to safety before Turk had the chance to
shoot. Sure enough, on Saturday, the dons order their respective minions to
perform the assassination. Sonny arrives at the parade ground first, shooting and
killing McCluskey before Turk arrives on the scene. Since Turk arrives too late,
he does not shoot.
In this scenario, Corleone’s order is an actual cause of McCluskey’s death; Barzini’s order is
not an actual cause, but merely a preempted backup. Still, McCluskey’s death doesn’t
counterfactually depend upon Corleone’s order: if Corleone hadn’t issued his order and so
Sonny hadn’t attempted to assassinate McCluskey, then Barzini would still have ordered Turk
to shoot and kill McCluskey, and Turk would have obliged.
Such pre-emption cases pose a challenge for anyone attempting to analyse actual causation
in terms of counterfactual dependence (see, for example, Lewis [1986a], pp. 200–2; Lewis
[2004], pp. 81–2). Though I shall not attempt to show it here, they also pose a challenge for
those seeking to analyse actual causation in terms of regularities (see Mackie [1965], p. 251;
Lewis [1973a], p. 557; Strevens [2007], pp. 98–102; Baumgartner [2013], pp. 99–100; Paul
and Hall [2013], pp. 74–5), and for those seeking to analyse actual causation in terms of
causal processes (see Paul and Hall [2013], pp. 55–7, 77–8). Halpern and Pearl ([2001],
[2005]) attempt to deal with such cases by appealing to structural equation models.
3 Structural Equation Models
A structural equation model (SEM),M, is an ordered pair 〈V,E〉, whereV is a set of
variables, and E is a set of structural equations.5 Each of the variables inV appears on the
left-hand side of exactly one structural equation in E. The variables inV comprise two
5My exposition of SEMs differs a little from that given by Halpern and Pearl ([2005], pp.
846–52): in the interests of simplicity, I omit technical details that are inessential for the
purposes of this paper.
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(disjoint) subsets: a setU of exogenous variables, the values of which do not depend upon the
values of any of the other variables in the model, and a set Y of endogenous variables, the
values of which do depend upon the values of other variables in the model. The structural
equation for each endogenous variable Y ∈ Y expresses the value of Y as a function of other
variables inV. That is, it has the form Y = fY(Vi,V j,Vk, . . .), where Vi,V j,Vk, . . . ∈ V\Y .
Such a structural equation conveys information about how the value of Y counterfactually
depends upon the values of the other variables inV.
Specifically, suppose that X,Z ∈ V and thatV\X,Z = {V1,V2, . . . ,Vn}. Then X appears as
an argument in the function on the right-hand side of the structural equation for Z just in case
there is a pair {x′, x′′} of possible values of X, a pair {z′, z′′} of possible values of Z and a
possible assignment of values V1 = v1,V2 = v2, . . . ,Vn = vn (abbreviated as ~V = ~v)6 to the
variables inV\X,Y such that it is true that (a) if it had been the case that X = x′ and that
~V = ~v, then it would have been the case that Z = z′; and (b) if it had been the case that X = x′′
and that ~V = ~v, then it would have been the case that Z = z′′. In other words, X appears on the
right-hand side of the equation for Z just in case there is some assignment of values to the
other variables in the model such that the value of Z depends upon that of X when the other
variables take the assigned values (see Pearl [2009], p. 97; Hitchcock [2001a], pp. 280–1). If
no variable appears on the right-hand side of the equation for Z, then Z is an exogenous
variable. In that case, the structural equation for Z simply takes the form Z = z∗, where z∗ is
the actual value of Z.
Any variables that appear as arguments in the function on the right-hand side of the
equation for a variable V are known as the ‘parents’ of V; V is a ‘child’ of theirs. The notion
of an ‘ancestor’ is defined in terms of the transitive closure of parenthood, that of a
‘descendent’ in terms of the transitive closure of childhood.
6In the vector notation used by Halpern and Pearl ([2005], e.g. pp. 848–9, 852), ~V denotes
an ordered sequence of variables 〈V1,V2, . . . ,Vn〉, while ~v denotes an ordered sequence of
values 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 such that, for all i, vi is a possible value of the variable Vi. The
assignment of values V1 = v1,V2 = v2, . . . ,Vn = vn can be abbreviated as
〈V1,V2, . . . ,Vn〉 = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉, or (even more concisely) ~V = ~v.
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Since structural equations encode information about counterfactual dependence, they differ
from algebraic equations: given the asymmetric nature of counterfactual dependence, a
structural equation Y = fY(Vi,V j,Vk, . . .) is not equivalent to fY(Vi,V j,Vk, . . .) = Y (see Pearl
[1995], p. 672; Pearl [2009], pp. 27–9; Hitchcock [2001a], p. 280; Halpern and Pearl [2005],
pp. 847–8; inter alia). Indeed, given a non-backtracking reading of counterfactuals (Lewis
[1979], pp. 456–8), the counterfactuals entailed by fY(Vi,V j,Vk, . . .) = Y will typically be
false where those entailed by Y = fY(Vi,V j,Vk, . . .) are true (see, e.g., Hitchcock [2001a], p.
280; Halpern and Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 2). Limiting our attention to models
entailing only non-backtracking counterfactuals helps to ensure that the SEMs that we
consider possess the property of acyclicity: they are such that for no variable Vi is it the case
that the value of Vi is a function of V j, which in turn is a function of Vk, which is a function of
. . . Vi. Acyclic models entail a unique solution for each variable.
Analyses of actual causation in terms of SEMs typically appeal to only those models that
encode only non-backtracking counterfactuals (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 280; Halpern and
Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 2). Doing so is important if such analyses are to deliver the
correct results about causal asymmetry. In virtue of their appeal to models encoding only
non-backtracking counterfactuals, analyses of actual causation in terms of SEMs can be seen
as continuous with the tradition, initiated by Lewis ([1973a]), of attempting to analyse
causation in terms of such counterfactuals (see Hitchcock [2001a], pp. 273–4; Halpern and
Pearl [2005], pp. 877–8).
An SEM,M = 〈V,E〉, can be given a graphical representation by taking the variables inV
as the nodes or vertices of the graph and drawing a directed edge (or ‘arrow’) from a variable
Vi to a variable V j (Vi,V j ∈ V) just in case Vi is a parent of V j according to the structural
equations in E. A ‘directed path’ can be defined as an ordered sequence of variables
〈Vi,V j, . . . ,Vk〉, such that there is a directed edge from Vi to V j, and a directed edge from V j to
. . . Vk (in other words, directed paths run from variables to their descendants).
In the terminology of Halpern and Pearl ([2005], pp. 851–2), where yi is a possible value of
Yi and Yi ∈ Y (the set of endogenous variables), a formula of the form Yi = yi is a primitive
event. In their notation, ϕ is a variable ranging over primitive events and Boolean
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combinations of primitive events (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 852).
One can evaluate a counterfactual of the form Vi = vi ∧ . . . ∧ Vk = vk  ϕ with respect to
an SEM,M = 〈V,E〉, by replacing the equations for Vi, . . . , and Vk in E with the equations
Vi = vi, . . . , and Vk = vk (thus treating each of Vi, . . . , and Vk as an exogenous variable), while
leaving all other equations in E intact. The result is a new set of equations E′. The
counterfactual holds in the original modelM = 〈V,E〉 just in case, in the solution to E′, ϕ
holds. This gives us a method for evaluating, with respect toM, even those counterfactuals
whose truth or falsity isn’t implied by any single equation in E considered alone (Hitchcock
2001a, 283): for example, counterfactuals saying how the value of a variable would differ if
the values of its grandparents were different.
This ‘equation replacement’ method for evaluating counterfactuals models what would
happen if the variables Vi, . . . , and Vk were set to the values Vi = vi, . . . , and Vk = vk by means
of ‘interventions’ (Woodward [2005], p. 98) or a small ‘miracles’ (Lewis [1979], p. 468).7 By
replacing the normal equations for Vi, . . . , and Vk (i.e. the equations for these variables that
appear in E) with the equations Vi = vi, . . . , and Vk = vk, while leaving all other equations
intact, we are not allowing the values of Vi, . . . , and Vk to be determined in the normal way, in
accordance with their usual structural equations, but rather taking them to be ‘miraculously’
set to the desired values (or at least set to the desired values via some process that is
exogenous to the system being modelled, and which interferes with its usual workings—see
Woodward [2005], p. 47). Evaluating counterfactuals in this way ensures the avoidance of
backtracking (cf. Lewis [1979], pp. 456–8): specifically, it ensures that we get the result that
if Vi = vi ∧ . . . ∧ Vk = vk, then the parents (and more generally, ancestors) of Vi, . . . , and Vk
would have had the same values (except where some of the variables Vi, . . . , and Vk
themselves have ancestors that are among Vi, . . . , and Vk), while the children (and, more
generally, descendants) of Vi, . . . , and Vk are susceptible to change. This is because the
structural equations for the ancestor and descendent variables (provided that they are not
7On this point, see (Pearl [1995], pp. 673–4), (Pearl [2009], pp. 32, 37, 69–70, 204–5, 317,
416–18), (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 283), (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 848–9), (Woodward
[2005], p. 48), and (Halpern and Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 2).
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themselves among Vi, . . . , and Vk) are left unchanged (cf. Pearl [2009], p. 205).
As observed by Halpern and Hitchcock ([forthcoming], Section 2), there are at least two
different views of the relationship between SEMs and counterfactuals to be found in the
literature.8 One view—adopted by Hitchcock ([2001a], pp. 274, 279–84, 287) and Woodward
([2005], pp. 42–3, 110), inter alia—is that structural equations are just summaries of sets of
(non-backtracking) counterfactuals: a structural equation of the form Y = fY(Vi,V j,Vk, . . .)
simply summarizes a set of (non-backtracking) counterfactuals of the form
Vi = vi ∧ V j = v j ∧ Vk = vk ∧ . . . Y = y which, taken together, say what the value of Y
would be for each possible assignment of values to Vi,V j,Vk, . . .. More generally, on this view,
an SEMM ‘encodes’ a set of counterfactuals—namely, the set of counterfactuals that are
evaluated as true when the ‘equation replacement’ method is applied toM—which are given a
non-backtracking semantics that is quite independent ofM.
This independent semantics might be a broadly Lewisian semantics (Lewis [1979]),
according to which a counterfactual Vi = vi ∧ V j = v j ∧ Vk = vk ∧ . . . Y = y is true iff
Y = y holds in a world in which each of Vi,V j,Vk, . . . is set to the value specified in the
antecedent by a ‘small miracle’.9 Alternatively, one might appeal to a Woodwardian semantics
(Woodward [2005]), on which the relevant world to consider is one in which each of
Vi,V j,Vk, . . . is set to the specified value by an intervention.10 These accounts both avoid
8Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to say more about this.
9I describe this semantics as ‘broadly Lewisian’ because Lewis ([1979]) himself focuses
upon counterfactuals concerning events, rather than variable-values, and (for the most part)
upon counterfactuals with relatively simple antecedents requiring only a single small miracle
to implement. Glynn ([2013], esp. pp. 49–51) has argued that Lewis’s semantics can be
extended—in roughly the way described in the main text above—to the sorts of
counterfactuals that SEMs can be taken to encode.
10Woodward ([2005], p. 98) gives a technically rigorous definition of the notion of an
intervention, as do Pearl ([1995], pp. 673, 679), Pearl ([2009], pp. 68–78, 88–9), and Spirtes
et al. ([2000], pp. 47–53). For a comparison of these various formal characterizations, see
(Woodward [2005] pp. 107–11). For the time being, it will suffice to think of an intervention
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backtracking because on neither account are we to evaluate counterfactuals with reference to
worlds in which their antecedents are realized as a result of different earlier conditions
operating via the usual causal processes.
An alternative view of the relationship between structural equations and
counterfactuals—adopted by Pearl ([2009], e.g. pp. 27–9, 33–8, 68-70, 202–15,
239–40)11—is that structural equations, rather than summarizing sets of counterfactuals,
represent causal mechanisms which are taken as primitives, and which are themselves taken to
ground counterfactuals (see Halpern and Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 2). Pearl ([2009],
p. 70), unlike Woodward12, defines ‘interventions’ as “local surgeries” (Pearl [2009], p. 223)
on the causal mechanisms that he takes to be represented by structural equations. He takes
such local surgeries to be formally represented by equation replacements (Pearl [2009], p. 70),
and takes the equation replacement procedure to constitute a semantics for the sort of
counterfactual conditional relevant to analysing actual causation (Pearl [2009], pp. 112–13,
Ch. 7)13. As he puts it, this interpretation bases “the notion of interventions directly on causal
mechanisms” (Pearl [2009], p. 112), and takes ‘equation replacement’—which he construes as
representing mechanism-modification—“to provide a semantics for counterfactual
statements” (Pearl [2009], p. 113).
On the ‘primitive causal mechanisms’ view, the asymmetry of structural equations and the
non-backtracking nature of the counterfactuals that (on this view) are given an
‘equation-replacement’ semantics follows from the asymmetry of the causal mechanisms
themselves (cf. Pearl [1995], p. 672; Pearl [2009], pp. 27, 29, 69). Specifically, as Pearl notes,
as a causal process that is exogenous to the system being modelled, and which interferes with
its usual workings, so that the value of the variable intervened upon is altered without any
alteration to those variables in the model that are its parents (or, more generally, its
non-descendants) (cf. Woodward [2005], p. 47).
11See also (Pearl [1995], p. 672) and (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 841, 851, 878).
12See (Woodward [2005], pp. 55n, 110) for a detailed exposition of the difference between
Pearl’s approach and Woodward’s.
13Cf. (Pearl [2009], pp. 420–1) and (Pearl [1995], p. 677).
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where mechanisms exhibit the desired causal asymmetry, the asymmetry of the equations
representing those mechanisms (i.e. the distinction between the dependent variable to appear
on the left-hand side of the structural equation and the independent variables to appear on the
right) can be “determined by appealing [. . . ] to the notion of hypothetical intervention and
asking whether an external control over one variable in the mechanism necessarily affects the
others” (Pearl [2009], p. 228). Recalling that Pearl defines interventions in terms of local
surgeries on mechanisms, the idea is that, where an equation Y = fY(Vi,V j,Vk, . . .) represents
an asymmetric causal mechanism, the value of Y would change under local surgeries on the
mechanism that affect the values of Vi, V j, Vk, . . . , but the values of Vi, V j, Vk, . . . , would not
change under local surgeries that affect the value of Y .
For present purposes there is no need to choose between the ‘summaries of counterfactuals’
and ‘primitive causal mechanisms’ construals of structural equations. It is worth noting,
however, that the choice between the two approaches may have implications for the potential
reductivity of an analysis of actual causation in terms of SEMs. If SEMs represent sets of
primitive causal mechanisms, then an analysis of actual causation in terms of SEMs will not
reduce actual causation to non-causal facts. By contrast, on the ‘summaries of
counterfactuals’ construal, an analysis of actual causation in terms of SEMs will potentially be
reductive if the counterfactuals summarized can be given a semantics—perhaps along the lines
of Lewis ([1979])—that doesn’t appeal to causal facts. Reduction will not, however, be
achieved if one instead adopts a semantics that appeals to causal notions, such as Woodward’s
‘interventionist’ semantics (see Woodward [2005], p. 98).
Nevertheless, even if the analysis is non-reductive it is plausible that it might still be
illuminating. Woodward ([2005], pp. 104–7) has rather convincingly argued that, although
non-reductive, an analysis of causation in terms of SEMs that summarize counterfactuals that
are given his interventionist semantics can be illuminating and can avoid viciously
circularity.14 Meanwhile, Halpern and Hitchcock ([forthcoming], Section 2) argue that if we
14For further discussion of the non-reductivity of Woodward’s approach and of whether it is
compatible with an illuminating account of actual causation, see (Strevens [2007], pp. 245–6),
(Woodward [2008], pp. 203–4), (Strevens [2008], esp. pp. 180–2), and (Glynn [2013], pp.
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adopt the ‘primitive causal mechanisms’ construal of structural equations, we can still give an
illuminating (though non-reductive) analysis of actual causation in terms of SEMs. In
particular, they observe that—on this construal—SEMs themselves “do not directly represent
relations of actual causation”, but merely an “underlying ‘causal structure”’ (Halpern and
Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 2) in terms of which actual causal relations can be
understood. A similar view appears to be taken by Pearl ([2009]). On Pearl’s view, such an
analysis reduces actual causation to facts about “causal mechanisms” (Pearl [2009], p. 112),
which are construed as “invariant linkages” (Pearl [2009], p. 223) or stable, law-like
relationships (Pearl [2009], pp. 224–5, 239), which are not themselves to be analysed in terms
of actual causation (cf. Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 849).
I shall not argue here that Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual causation, or the
probabilistic extension that I shall propose in Section 8, can be converted into a fully reductive
analysis of actual causation in non-causal terms. I agree with the authors just cited that an
analysis can be illuminating without being fully reductive.
4 The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’
Before stating Halpern and Pearl’s analysis of actual causation, it is necessary to introduce
some more of their terminology. Recall that, given an SEM,M = 〈V,E〉, Halpern and Pearl
([2005], pp. 851–2) call a formula of the form Y = y a primitive event where Y ∈ Y (Y being
the subset ofV that comprises the endogenous variables) and y is a possible value of Y . They
take ϕ to be a variable ranging over primitive events and Boolean combinations of primitive
events (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 852).
Where Y1, . . . ,Yn are variables in Y (each of which is distinct from any variable that
appears in the formula ϕ), Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852) call a formula of the form
[Y1 = y1, . . . ,Yn = yn]ϕ, which they abbreviate [~Y = ~y]ϕ, a basic causal formula. Such a
formula says that if it had been the case that Y1 = y1, . . . , and Yn = yn, then it would have been
the case that ϕ (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 852). As such [~Y = ~y]ϕ is simply a notational
variant on Y1 = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ Yn = yn  ϕ (Pearl [2009], pp. 70n, 108n; cf. Halpern and Pearl
47–8).
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[2005], p. 852n).15 Finally, a context is an assignment of values to the variables inU (i.e. the
exogenous variables inV) (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 849). That is, where
U = {U1, . . . ,Um}, a context is an assignment of a value to each Ui: U1 = u1, . . . ,Um = um.
Such an assignment is abbreviated ~U = ~u or simply as ~u (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 847,
849).
Given a context ~U = ~u, the structural equations for the endogenous variablesY in an acyclic
SEMM determine a unique value for each of the variables in Y. Halpern and Pearl ([2005],
p. 852) write (M, ~u)  ϕ if ϕ holds in the unique solution to the modelM′ that results fromM
when the equations inM for the exogenous variablesU are replaced with equations setting
these variables to the values that they are assigned in the context ~U = ~u. That is, (M, ~u)  ϕ
says that, if the exogenous variables inM were to take the values ~U = ~u, then (according to
M) ϕ would hold. Moreover, Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852) write (M, ~u)  [~Y = ~y]ϕ if ϕ
holds in the unique solution to the modelM′′ that results fromM′ by replacing the equations
for the variables ~Y with equations setting these variables equal to the values ~Y = ~y. That is,
(M, ~u)  [~Y = ~y]ϕ says that, given the context ~U = ~u, the causal formula—i.e.
counterfactual—[~Y = ~y]ϕ holds (according toM). By contrast, (M, ~u) 2 [~Y = ~y]ϕ says that,
given the context ~U = ~u, the causal formula [~Y = ~y]ϕ does not hold (according toM).
15Following Halpern and Hitchcock ([forthcoming]) (cf. Pearl [2009], p. 330) I adopt
slightly different notation than Halpern and Pearl in that I use ‘=’ rather than ‘←’ as an
assignment operator in writing out causal formulas. Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852n) write
(e.g.) ~Y ← ~y rather than ~Y = ~y in their basic causal formulas as a reminder that the formula
says what would happen if the variables ~Y were set to the values ~y by interventions
(alternatively: small miracles/local surgeries) rather than what would happen if the variables ~Y
came to have the values ~y as a result of different initial conditions operating via the ordinary
structural equations. As such, the ‘←’ notation serves the same function as Pearl’s ‘do(·)’
operator (as in do(~Y = ~y)) (Godszmidt and Pearl [1992], pp. 669–71; Pearl [2009] esp. pp. 70,
70n). Using ‘=’ rather than ‘←’ is harmless (and avoids the multiplication of notation)
provided that it is borne in mind that a ‘basic causal formula’ expresses a counterfactual which
is to be given a non-backtracking semantics.
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Similarly, (M, ~u) 2 ϕ says that, in the context ~U = ~u, ϕ does not hold (according toM).
The types of events that Halpern and Pearl allow to be actual causes are primitive events
and conjunctions of primitive events (for simplicity, I’ll take a primitive event to be a limiting
case of a conjunction of primitive events in what follows): that is, actual causes have the form
X1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xn = xn (for X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Y), abbreviated ~X = ~x (Halpern and Pearl [2001], p.
196; Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 853). The events that they allow as effects are primitive
events and arbitrary Boolean combinations of primitive events (Halpern and Pearl [2001], p.
196; Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 853). They define ‘actual cause’ as follows (Halpern and
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Pearl [2001], pp. 196–7).16,17,18,19
16I have made minor notational adjustments to Halpern and Pearl’s definition for
consistency with my own notation. I have also inserted some clarificatory text within double
square brackets—i.e. [[. . . ]]. I use double square brackets for this purpose so as to avoid
confusion with Halpern and Pearl’s use of single square brackets—i.e. [. . . ]. They use single
square brackets to delimit the antecedents of causal formulas.
17Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852) regard this definition as merely ‘preliminary’, for
reasons that I discuss at the end of Section 5, below.
18I here state the version of the definition given in (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 196–7)
(with minor notational changes), rather than the version given in (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p.
853). The two versions differ only in condition AC2(b). In the later article, AC2(b) is slightly
more complicated. The additional complication is intended to address a putative
counterexample, given by Hopkins and Pearl ([2003], pp. 85–6), to the earlier version of the
definition (see Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 882). However, it is not clear that this additional
complication is really necessary. Christopher Hitchcock, in personal communication with
Brad Weslake (Weslake [forthcoming], fn.15), has suggested (to my mind very plausibly) that
the example given by Hopkins and Pearl is really just a preemption case, of the sort that the
original Halpern and Pearl ([2001], pp. 196–7) definition can handle without modification.
Weslake ([forthcoming], fn.15) concurs that the modification proposed in (Halpern and Pearl
[2005]) is not the correct way to respond to the example given by Hopkins and Pearl, and that
treating it as a preemption case is a “better way to handle” it (Weslake [forthcoming], fn.15)
(though Weslake ([forthcoming], Section 4) himself ultimately endorses an account of actual
causation that differs from both versions of Halpern and Pearl’s). Halpern and Hitchcock
([forthcoming], Appendix) and Halpern ([unpublished], Section 4) also suggest that the
modification introduced by Halpern and Pearl ([2005]) is not necessary. Consequently I prefer
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(AC) ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M, ~u) [[i.e. in modelM given the context ~u]] if the
following three conditions hold:
AC1. (M, ~u)  (~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ. (That is, both ~X = ~x and ϕ are true in the actual world.)
AC2. There exists a partition (~Z, ~W) of Y [[i.e. the set of endogenous variables in the model
M]] with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x ′, ~w ′) of the variables in (~X, ~W) such that [[where]]
(M, ~u)  Zi = z∗i for [[all]] Zi ∈ ~Z, [[the following holds:]]
(a) (M, ~u)  [~X = ~x ′, ~W = ~w ′]¬ϕ. In words, changing (~X, ~W) from (~x, ~w) to (~x ′, ~w ′)
changes ϕ from true to false,
(b) (M, ~u)  [~X = ~x, ~W = ~w ′, ~Z′ = ~z ∗]ϕ for all subsets ~Z′ of ~Z. In words, setting ~W to
~w ′ should have no effect on ϕ, as long as ~X is kept at its [[actual]] value ~x, even if
all the variables in an arbitrary subset of ~Z are set to their original values in the
context ~u.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no [[strict]] subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2. Minimality
ensures that only those elements of the conjunction ~X = ~x that are essential for changing
ϕ in AC2(a) are considered part of a cause; inessential elements are pruned.
As Halpern and Pearl ([2001], p. 197) observe, the core of the definition is AC2. They observe
that, informally, the variables in ~Z can be thought of as describing the ‘active causal process’
the original, simpler, definition presented in (Halpern and Pearl [2001]).
19Oddly, despite the fact that Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) consistently describe this
as a ‘definition’, it (both in the variant presented in (Halpern and Pearl [2001]) and the variant
presented in (Halpern and Pearl [2005])) takes the form of a merely sufficient condition.
Nevertheless, I take it that it is charitable to regard Halpern and Pearl as intending to offer it as
a necessary and sufficient condition, since their discussion of how this ‘definition’ handles the
standard battery of test cases (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 197–202; Halpern and Pearl
[2005], pp. 859–69) only really makes sense on this assumption.
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from ~X = ~x to ϕ (Halpern and Pearl [2001], p. 197).20 They demonstrate (Halpern and Pearl
[2005], pp. 879–80) that, where a partition (~Z, ~W) is such that AC2 is satisfied, all variables in
~Z lie on a directed path from a variable in ~X to a variable in ϕ. The variables in ~W, on the other
hand, are not part of the active causal process (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 854).
Condition AC2(a) says that there exists a (non-actual) assignment ~X = ~x ′ of possible values
to the variables ~X such that if the variables ~X had taken the values ~X = ~x ′, while the variables
~W had taken the values ~W = ~w ′, then ¬ϕ would have held (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 854).
Condition AC2(a) thus doesn’t require that ϕ straightforwardly counterfactually depend upon
~X = ~x but rather requires (more weakly) that ϕ counterfactually depend upon ~X = ~x under the
contingency (i.e. when it is built into the antecedent of the counterfactual) that ~W = ~w ′
(Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 854).
On the other hand, condition AC2(b) is designed to ensure that it is ~X = ~x, operating via the
directed path(s) upon which the variables in ~Z lie, rather than ~W = ~w, that is causally
responsible for ϕ. It does this by requiring that if the variables in ~X had taken the values
~X = ~x, and any arbitrary subset ~Z′ of ~Z had taken their actual values ~Z′ = ~z ∗ while the values
of the variables in ~W had taken the values ~W = ~w ′, then ϕ would still have held (Halpern and
Pearl [2005], pp. 854–5).
Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC relativizes the notion of ‘actual causation’ to an SEM.
This might be thought a slightly odd feature, since ordinarily we take actual causation to be an
objective feature of the world that is not model-relative. Others who have attempted to analyse
actual causation in terms of SEMs have sought to avoid model-relativity by suggesting that
~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ simpliciter provided that there exists at least one ‘appropriate’
SEM relative to which ~X = ~x satisfies the criteria for being a (model-relative) actual cause of ϕ
20It is worth emphasizing that this is merely an informal gloss. Nothing in Halpern and
Pearl’s definition requires that we go beyond a counterfactual understanding of ‘actual cause’
and posit the existence of anything like irreducible causal processes. As Halpern and Pearl
define it, this notion of an ‘active causal process’ is just a generalization of Hitchcock’s notion
of an ‘active route’ (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 286), which can be defined in purely counterfactual
terms (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 286).
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(Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287; cf. Woodward [2008], p. 209).21 We could use this strategy to
extract a non-model-relative notion of actual causation from Halpern and Pearl’s definition. Of
course, this strategy requires us to say what constitutes an ‘appropriate’ SEM. Though this
isn’t an altogether straightforward task, progress has been made (see Hitchcock [2001a], p.
287; Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], esp. pp. 394–9; and Blanchard and Schaffer
[forthcoming], Section 1). I won’t review all of the criteria for model ‘appropriateness’ that
have been advanced in the literature. Suffice it to say that the SEMs outlined below satisfy all
of the standard criteria that have been suggested.
One criterion is worth mentioning, however. Hitchcock has suggested that, to be
‘appropriate’, a modelM must “entail no false counterfactuals” (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287).
By this he means that evaluating counterfactuals with respect toM by means of the ‘equation
replacement’ method doesn’t lead to evaluations of counterfactuals as true when they are in
fact false (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 283).22 I shall discuss an analogous criterion for the
‘appropriateness’ of probabilistic causal models when I discuss the latter in Section 7 below.
5 Preemption Again
To see that Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC delivers the correct result in the simple
preemption case described in Section 2 above, it is necessary to provide an SEM. I will call
the model developed in this section ‘PE’.
Let C, B, S , T , and D be binary variables, where C takes value 1 if Corleone orders Sonny
to shoot and kill McCluskey, and takes value 0 if he doesn’t; B takes value 1 if Barzini orders
Turk to shoot and kill McCluskey, 0 if he doesn’t; S takes value 1 if Sonny shoots, 0 if he
21I’m making the point here with respect to the sort of Boolean combinations of primitive
events that Halpern and Pearl themselves take to be potential causes and effects.
22As Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming], Section 1.3) point out, this requirement
commits Hitchcock (on pain of triviality) to the existence of a semantics for the
counterfactuals ‘entailed’ byM that doesn’t simply appeal to the results of equation
replacement with respect toM.
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doesn’t; T takes value 1 if Turk shoots, 0 if he doesn’t; and D takes value 1 if McCluskey dies,
and 0 if he survives. To these variables, let us add two more binary variables: CI which takes
value 1 if Corleone intends to issue his order and 0 if he doesn’t, and BI which takes value 1 if
Barzini intends to issue his order, and 0 if he doesn’t.23
The system of structural equations for this example is as follows:
i. CI = 1
ii. BI = 1
iii. C = CI
iv. B = BI
v. S = C
vi. T = Min{B, 1 − S }
vii. D = Max{S ,T }
In our model PE,U = {CI, BI}. That is, the variables CI and BI are the exogenous variables.
Equations (i) and (ii) simply state their actual values, CI = 1 and BI = 1, representing the fact
that Corleone forms his intention and that Barzini forms his intention. Thus the actual context
is ~u = {CI = 1, BI = 1}.
23The reason for adding these two variables is that AC doesn’t allow the values of
exogenous variables to act as actual causes. Since we’re interested in evaluating whether
C = 1 and B = 1 are actual causes of D = 1, we therefore have to ensure the endogeneity of C
and B by including in our model variables upon which the values of C and B depend. Halpern
and Pearl’s disallowance of the values of exogenous variables from counting as actual causes
is somewhat arbitrary, though harmless. It is harmless because in general we can ensure the
endogeneity of a variable that we wish to evaluate as a putative cause by including in our
variable set variables upon which its value depends, as I have done here for the variables C
and B.
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In PE, Y = {C, B, S ,T,D}. That is, the variables C, B, S , T , and D are the endogenous
variables. The structural equations for these variables express their values as a function of
other variables in the model. Equation (iii) says that if Corleone had formed the intention to
issue his order, then he would have issued it, but that he wouldn’t have issued it if he hadn’t
formed the intention to. We might express this informally by saying that Corleone issues his
order ‘just in case’ he forms the intention to. Equation (iv) then says that Barzini issues his
order ‘just in case’ he forms the intention to; (v) says that Sonny shoots just in case Corleone
issues his order; (vi) says that Turk shoots just in case Barzini issues his order and Sonny does
not shoot; and (vii) says that McCluskey dies just in case either Sonny or Turk shoots.
Given the context, ~u = {CI = 1, BI = 1}, the values of the (endogenous) variables in Y are
uniquely determined in accordance with the structural equations. The unique solution to our
set of structural equations is: CI = 1, BI = 1, C = 1, B = 1, S = 1, T = 0, D = 1. That is:
Corleone forms the intention to issue his order; Barzini forms the intention to issue his order;
Corleone issues his order; Barzini issues his order; Sonny shoots; Turk doesn’t shoot;
McCluskey dies.
We can give PE a graphical representation by following the conventions for drawing such
graphs that were outlined in Section 3. Following Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 862), I omit
exogenous variables from the graph. The resulting graph is given as Figure 1.
C S D
TB
Figure 1: A graphical representation of the model PE.
With the model PE of our preemption case in hand, we are in a position to see that AC
correctly diagnoses Corleone’s order (C = 1) as an actual cause of McCluskey’s death
(D = 1). To see that it does, let ~X = {C}, with ~x = {C = 1} and ~x ′ = {C = 0}. Let ϕ be D = 1.
In the solution to the structural equations, given the actual context ~u = {CI = 1, BI = 1}, C = 1
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and D = 1 hold. So condition AC1 of AC is satisfied. Condition AC3 is also satisfied, since
~X = {C} has no (non-empty) strict subsets. So everything hinges on whether AC2 is satisfied.
To see that AC2 is satisfied, let ~Z = 〈C, S ,D〉, let ~W = 〈B,T 〉, and let ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0}.
First note that AC2(a) is satisfied because, in the set of structural equations that results from
replacing equation (iii) with (iii′) C = 0, and the equations (iv) and (vi) with (iv′) B = 1, and
(vi′) T = 0, the solution for D is D = 0. This means that it is true that:
(PE, {CI = 1, BI = 1})  [C = 0 ∧ B = 1 ∧ T = 0]¬D = 1
That is, in the model PE and the context {CI = 1; BI = 1} it is true that, if Corleone hadn’t
issued his order and Barzini had issued his order, but Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey
wouldn’t have died.
To see that AC2(b) is satisfied, note that the structural equations in PE ensure that if C = 1,
then D = 1, no matter what values are taken by the variables in ~W = 〈B,T 〉, and that this
remains so even if we build into the antecedent of the relevant counterfactual the additional
information that S = 1 and/or D = 1 holds (i.e. even if an arbitrary subset of the variables in ~Z
were to take the original values that they received in the context {CI = 1, BI = 1}). For
instance it is true that:
(PE, {CI = 1, BI = 1})  [C = 1 ∧ B = 1 ∧ T = 0 ∧ S = 1]D = 1
That is, given the model and the context, D would have taken value D = 1 if C had taken its
actual value C = 1, while B and T had taken the values B = 1 and T = 0, even if S had taken
its actual value S = 1.
So AC2(b) is satisfied. We have already seen that AC1, AC3, and AC2(a) are satisfied. So
AC yields the correct verdict that C = 1 (Corleone’s order) is an actual cause of D = 1
(McCluskey’s death).
Definition AC also yields the correct verdict that B = 1 (Barzini’s order) is not an actual
cause of D = 1. In order to get the sort of contingent dependence of D = 1 upon B = 1
required by condition AC2(a), it will be necessary for S to take the non-actual value S = 0.
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The trouble is that if it were also the case that certain subsets of the variables on the
Barzini-process were to take their actual values (in particular, the set {T }), then variable D
would take the value D = 0, contrary to the requirement of condition AC2(b).
For example, consider the obvious partition ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉 and ~W = 〈C, S 〉, and consider the
assignment ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 0}. Condition AC2(a) is satisfied for this partition and this
assignment.24 In particular, it is true that:
(PE, {CI = 1, BI = 1})  [B = 0 ∧C = 1 ∧ S = 0]¬D = 1
That is to say, in the model and the context, if Barzini hadn’t issued his order and Corleone
had issued his order, but Sonny hadn’t shot, then McCluskey wouldn’t have died.
But notice that AC2(b) is not satisfied for this partition and assignment of values to ~W. For
take ~Z′ = {T } ⊂ ~Z, and observe that:
(PE, {CI = 1, BI = 1}) 2 [B = 1 ∧C = 1 ∧ S = 0 ∧ T = 0]D = 1
That is, in the model and the context, it is false that if B had taken its actual value B = 1, and
the variables in ~W = 〈C, S 〉 had taken the values C = 1 and S = 0 (the values that they receive
under the assignment ~w ′), while the subset ~Z′ = {T } of the variables in ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉 had taken
their actual values—namely, T = 0—then it would have been that D = 1. Intuitively: it is not
24Note that, in this case, the assignment appealed to—viz. ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 0}—involves S
taking the non-actual value S = 0. Definition AC allows us to consider non-actual
assignments ~w ′ of values to the variables ~W. Without doing so, it would be unable to handle
cases of symmetric overdetermination (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 856–8). The
probabilistic extension of AC that I will suggest below also allows us to consider such
non-actual assignments. Though I shall not attempt to demonstrate it here, consideration of
non-actual assignments is needed in the probabilistic case in order to correctly diagnose cases
in which two causes symmetrically overdetermine the probability of an effect (an example of
this is described in Glynn [2009], Section 4.5.4.C).
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the case that if Barzini had issued his order, Corleone had issue his order, but Sonny hadn’t
shot, and (as was actually the case) Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey would have died.
Nor is there any other partition (~Z, ~W) of the endogenous variables {C, B, S ,T,D} such that
AC2 is satisfied. In particular, none of the remaining variables on the Barzini-process {T,D}
can be assigned to ~W instead of ~Z, for the values of each of these variables ‘screens off’ B
from D, so the result would be that for any assignment ~w of values to the variables in ~W, not
both AC2(a) and AC2(b) are satisfied. On the other hand, at least one of the variables on the
initial Corleone-process {C, S } must be an element of ~W, since only by supposing that such a
variable takes value 0 do we get the contingent dependence required by AC2(a). But
reassigning the other variable to ~Z will not affect the fact that AC2(b) fails to hold: it will
remain true that, if B = 1, but T = 0, and some variable on the Corleone-process had taken
value 0, then it would have been that D = 0, so that AC2(b) is violated.
So AC gives the correct diagnosis of this sort of pre-emption. It does so on intuitively the
correct grounds. Specifically, the reason Corleone’s order is counted as a cause is that (i) given
Turk’s non-shooting, McCluskey’s death depends upon Corleone’s order; and (ii) there is a
complete causal process running from Corleone’s order to McCluskey’s death as indicated by
the fact that, for arbitrary subsets of events on the Corleone-process, it is true that if Corleone
had issued his order, and Turk hadn’t shot, and those events had occurred, then McCluskey
would have died.
By contrast, Barzini’s order isn’t counted as a cause because, although (i) given Sonny’s
non-shooting, McCluskey’s death counterfactually depends upon Barzini’s order;25
nevertheless (ii) there is no complete causal process from Barzini’s order to McCluskey’s
death as indicated by the fact that, for example, if Barzini issued his order and Sonny didn’t
shoot but (as was actually the case) Turk didn’t shoot, then McCluskey would have survived.
The example that we have been considering is one of so-called ‘early pre-emption’.
Halpern and Pearl show how their account provides similarly intuitive treatments of
25For reasons outlined in Footnote 24 above, definition AC correctly allows us to suppose
that Sonny doesn’t shoot (even though actually Sonny does shoot) in looking for contingent
counterfactual dependence of McCluskey’s death upon Barzini’s order.
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symmetric overdetermination and partial causation (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 197–8;
Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 856–8), hastening and delaying (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp.
198–9; Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 859–60), late pre-emption (Halpern and Pearl [2001],
pp. 199–200; Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 861–4), causation by omission (Halpern and Pearl
[2005], pp. 865–7), double prevention (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 867–9), and a range of
other cases (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 200–2).
There are, however, some more subtle cases that they claim their definition does not
diagnose correctly (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 869–77). They take the view that, as it
stands, AC is too liberal. They attempt to deal with the problem cases (Halpern and Pearl
[2005], p. 870) by appealing to the notion of an extended causal model. This is simply defined
as an ordered pair 〈〈V,E〉,A〉, where 〈V,E〉 is an SEM, andA is a set of allowable settings
for the endogenous variables Y ⊂ V.26 A setting of a subset of the endogenous variables is
allowable if it can be extended to a setting inA. The idea is then to require that the variable
setting ~W = ~w ′, appealed to in condition AC2 of their definition AC, be an allowable setting.
Halpern and Pearl wish to count as non-allowable those settings that correspond to
“unreasonable” (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 869) or “fanciful” (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p.
870) scenarios.
Elsewhere in the structural equations literature, attempts have been made to analyse actual
causation in terms of SEMs that represent only ‘serious possibilities’ (Hitchcock [2001a], pp.
287, 294, 298; Woodward [2005], pp. 86–91). More recently, attempts have been made to
provide a more rigorous account of allowable settings in terms of normality rankings over
possible worlds (Halpern [2008], pp. 203–5; Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], pp. 400–3;
Halpern and Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 6; cf. Halpern and Pearl [2001], p. 202).
We needn’t go into the details here. The cases that are claimed to require a restriction to
allowable settings tend to be rather subtle. Perhaps a fully adequate analysis of probabilistic
actual causation would require a similar restriction. It seems plausible that the criteria for
allowable settings that have been developed in the literature on deterministic actual causation
carry over to the probabilistic case. Indeed one of the criteria for ‘normality’ that has been
26My notation differs slightly from Halpern and Pearl’s.
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suggested is statistical frequency (Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], p. 402; Halpern and
Hitchcock [forthcoming], Section 5): clearly such a notion is applicable in a probabilistic
context. Yet Halpern ([unpublished], Section 1) and Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming],
esp. Section 3) have raised doubts about the need to supplement Halpern and Pearl’s account
with a normality-based restriction on allowable settings. Consequently I will just focus upon
extending the unrestricted version of their definition to the probabilistic case here.
A modification of AC that I will consider in some detail (because it is very plausible, and
plausibly ought to be carried across to the probabilistic case too) is what Halpern and Pearl
([2005], p. 859) call “a contrastive extension to the definition of cause”. It is rather plausible
that actual causation is contrastive in nature (Hitchcock [1996a], [1996b]; Schaffer [2005],
[2013]). Often, our judgements of actual causation, rather than taking the form ‘~X = ~x actually
caused ϕ’, instead take the form ‘~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ actually caused ϕ rather than ϕ′’,
where ~x , ~x ′ and ϕ is incompatible with ϕ′ (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859) or, more
generally, ‘~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ actually caused ϕ rather than ϕ′’, where ~X = ~x ′ denotes a
set of formulas of the form ~X = ~x ′ such that, for each such formula, ~x , ~x ′, and where ϕ′
represents a set of formulas of the form ϕ′ such that, for each such formula, ϕ is incompatible
with ϕ′ (cf. Schaffer [2005], e.g. pp. 327, 328). Following Schaffer ([2005], p. 329), I will call
~X = ~x ′ and ϕ′ ‘contrast sets’. The view that actual causation is contrastive both on the cause
side and on the effect side is thus the view that actual causation is a quaternary relation
(Schaffer [2005], p. 327, [2013], p. 46) with ~X = ~x, ~X = ~x ′, ϕ, and ϕ′ as its relata, rather than
a binary relation with just ~X = ~x and ϕ as its relata.27 The suggestion is that claims like ‘~X = ~x
is an actual cause of ϕ’ are incomplete and liable to be ambiguous, since no contrast sets are
explicitly specified.28
To illustrate the plausibility of the view that actual causation is contrastive, consider a case
27Interestingly, Schaffer ([2013], p. 48) suggests that construing causation as contrastive in
nature may make appeals to ‘defaults’ or ‘normality’—of the sort discussed in the main text in
the three paragraphs preceding this one—unnecessary in the analysis of actual cause.
28Though ambiguity is avoided if context picks out the relevant contrast sets (see, for
example, Schaffer [2005], p. 329).
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where Doctor can administer either no dose, one dose, or two doses of Medicine to Patient.
Patient will fail to recover if no dose is administered, but will recover if either one or two
doses are administered. Let us suppose that Doctor in fact administers two doses, and Patient
recovers. It would be natural to model this causal scenario using a ternary variable M which
takes value 0, 1, or 2, according to whether Doctor administers 0, 1, or 2 doses of Medicine,
and a binary variable R which takes value 0 if Patient fails to recover, and 1 if she recovers.
We can also add an exogenous variable I that takes value 0 if Doctor intends to administer
zero doses, 1 if Doctor intends to administer 1 dose, and 2 if Doctor intends to administer 2
doses. The three structural equations for this case are then I = 2, M = I and
R = M/Max{M, 1}. The actual solution is I = 2, M = 2, and R = 1.
I think that the natural reaction to the claim ‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine
caused Patient to recover’ is one of ambivalence. (At least if there are no further contextual
factors to pick out one of the two alternative actions available to Doctor as the relevant one.)
While one of the alternative actions available to Doctor (M = 0) would have made a difference
to whether or not Patient recovered, the other (M = 1) would have made no difference. A
natural interpretation of our ambivalent attitude is that causation is contrastive in nature, and
that ‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine caused Patient to recover’ is ambiguous
between ‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine rather than no doses caused Patient
to recover’ (to which most people would presumably assent) and ‘Doctor’s administering two
doses of Medicine rather than one dose caused Patient to recover’ (to which most people
would presumably not assent).
Yet, as it stands, AC unequivocally yields the result that M = 2 was an actual cause of
R = 1. Suppose that ~X = {M}, ~x = {M = 2}, ~x ′ = {M = 0}, and that ϕ is R = 1. Since M = 2
and R = 1 are the values of M and R in the actual world (or rather the world where this causal
scenario unfolds), AC1 is satisfied. Since ~X = {M} has no (non-empty) strict subsets, AC3 is
satisfied. To see that AC2 is satisfied, consider the partition (~Z, ~W) of the endogenous
variables in our model such that ~Z = 〈M,R〉 and ~W = ∅. Condition AC2(a) will be satisfied if,
for some assignment of values to the variables in ~W it is true that, if the variables in ~W had
taken those values and M had taken value M = 0, then R would have taken value R = 0. Since
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there are no variables in ~W, AC2(a) reduces to the requirement that if M had taken value
M = 0 then R would have taken the value R = 0. Since our model implies that this is so,
AC2(a) is satisfied. Finally, condition AC2(b) is rather trivially satisfied. Since there are no
variables in ~W or in ~Z\M,R, AC2(b) just reduces to the requirement that if it had been that
M = 2, then it would have been that R = 1. Since our model implies that this is so, AC2(b) is
satisfied. Since, as we have seen, AC1, AC2(a), and AC3 are also all satisfied, AC yields the
result that M = 2 is an actual cause of R = 1.
Definition AC is unequivocal that M = 2 is a cause of R = 1, whereas intuition is equivocal.
It would therefore seem desirable to modify AC to bring it into closer alignment with
intuition. Specifically, it would seem desirable to adjust AC so that it can capture the nuances
of our contrastive causal judgements (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859). This is easily
achieved. To turn AC into an analysis of ~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ being an actual cause of ϕ,
we simply need to require that AC2(a) hold, not just for some non-actual setting of ~X, but for
precisely the setting ~X = ~x ′ (cf. Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859). More generally, to turn AC
into an analysis of ~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ being an actual cause of ϕ, where ~X = ~x ′ denotes
a set of formulas of the form ~X = ~x ′, we simply need to require that AC2(a) hold for every
formula of the form ~X = ~x ′ in ~X = ~x ′.
This gives the correct results in the example just considered. The reason that the original
version of AC yielded the unequivocal result that M = 2 is an actual cause of R = 1 is that the
original version of AC2(a) requires simply that there be some or other alternative value of M
such that if M had taken that alternative value (and the variables in ~W had taken some possible
assignment), then it would have been the case that R = 0. This condition is satisfied because
M = 0 is such a value. The revised version of AC just proposed does not give an unequivocal
result about whether M = 2 is an actual cause of R = 1. Indeed, it doesn’t yield any result until
a contrast set for M = 2 is specified.
The revised version of AC does yield the verdict that M = 2 rather than M = 0 was an
actual cause of R = 1. Specifically, taking the contrast set to be {M = 0}, the revised version of
AC is satisfied for precisely the same reason that taking ~X = ~x ′ to be M = 0 allowed us to
show that the original version of AC is satisfied when we consider M = 2 as a putative cause
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of R = 1. The revised version of AC also yields the verdict that M = 2 rather than M = 1 is
not a cause of R = 1. This is because the revised version of AC2(a) is violated when we take
{M = 1} to be the contrast set. Specifically, it’s not the case that if M had taken the value
M = 1 (and the variables in ~W had taken some possible assignment—a trivially satisfied
condition in this case because ~W = ∅)29, then the variable R would have taken R = 0. The
revised AC thus gives the intuitively correct results about these contrastive causal claims.
Moreover, it can explain the equivocality of intuition about the claim ‘M = 2 was an actual
cause of R = 1’ in terms of its ambiguity between ‘M = 2 rather than M = 0 was an actual
cause of R = 1’ (which it evaluates as true) and ‘M = 2 rather than M = 1 was an actual cause
of R = 1’ (which it evaluates as false).
As suggested above, we may find it plausible to build contrast in on the effect-side too
(Schaffer [2005], p. 328; Woodward [2005], p. 146). To change our previous example
somewhat, suppose that one dose of Medicine leads to speedy recovery, two doses leads to
slow recovery (two doses is an ‘overdose’ which would adversely affect Patient’s natural
immune response), while zero doses leads to no recovery. Suppose that Doctor in fact
administers two doses, and so Patient recovers slowly. In this case, we might reasonably
represent the outcome using a variable that has three possible values: R = 0 represents no
recovery, R = 1 represents speedy recovery, and R = 2 represents slow recovery. Taking M
and I to be variables with the same possible values (with the same interpretations) as before,
the structural equations for this new case are I = 2, M = I and R = M. The actual solution is
I = 2, M = 2 and R = 2.
We might wish to have the capacity to analyse causal claims of the form ‘Doctor’s
administering two doses rather than one dose of Medicine caused Patient to recover slowly
rather than quickly’. It is unproblematic to modify AC to achieve this. In order to analyse a
claim of the form ‘~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ actually caused ϕ rather than ϕ′’ we simply need
to replace ¬ϕ with ϕ′ in condition AC2(a) (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859) and require that
the modified AC2(a) hold, not just for some non-actual setting of ~X, but for precisely the
29From now on, wherever it is specified that ~W = ∅, I shall leave this parenthetical
qualification implicit.
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setting ~X = ~x ′ (cf. Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859). This yields the correct result in the
present case because, while the actual value of M is M = 2 and the actual value of R is R = 2,
it is true that if M had taken the value M = 1, then R would have taken the value R = 1.
More generally, suppose that we wish to analyse claims of the form ‘~X = ~x rather than
~X = ~x ′ actually caused ϕ rather than ϕ′’, where ~X = ~x ′ denotes a set of formulas of the form
~X = ~x ′ such that, for each such formula, ~x , ~x ′, and where ϕ′ represents a set of formulas of
the form ϕ′ such that, for each such formula, ϕ is incompatible with ϕ′. To do this we simply
need to require that, for each formula of the form ~X = ~x ′ in ~X = ~x ′ there is some formula of
the form ϕ′ in ϕ′ such that AC2(a) holds when ¬ϕ is replaced with ϕ′ and the non-actual
setting of ~X appealed to in AC2(a) is taken to be precisely the setting ~X = ~x ′ (cf. Schaffer
[2005], p. 348).30
This revised definition reduces to the original AC in the case where the putative cause is a
primitive event X = x (rather than a conjunction of primitive events) and the putative effect is a
primitive event Y = y (rather than an arbitrary Boolean combination of primitive events) and
the variables X and Y representing those primitive events are binary, with their alternative
possible values being X = x′ and Y = y′ (x , x′, y , y′). In such a case, the setting ~X = ~x of
the putative cause variables appealed to in the unmodified AC is just the setting X = x, and the
variable ϕ representing the putative effect is simply to be replaced by Y = y. Since, in this
case, there is only one possible but non-actual value of X, namely the value x′, X = x′ is
automatically the non-actual setting of the putative cause variable appealed to in the
unmodified AC2(a). Likewise, in such a case, ¬ϕ (which appears in AC2(a)) just means
¬Y = y which, because Y is binary, just corresponds to Y = y′. Moreover, in such a case,
{X = x′} and {Y = y′} automatically serve as the contrast sets appealed to in AC2(a) where AC
is modified (in the way suggested in the previous paragraph) to incorporate contrastivity. This
is because there are no other possible but non-actual values of the putative cause and effect
variables. So, under these circumstances, both the original and revised version of AC2(a)
30We might also require that for every ϕ′ in ϕ′ there is some event of the form ~X = ~x ′ in
~X = ~x ′ such that AC2(a) holds when ¬ϕ is replaced with ϕ′ and the non-actual setting of ~X
appealed to in AC2(a) is taken to be precisely the setting ~X = ~x ′ (cf. Schaffer [2005], p. 348).
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require the same thing: namely that Y would take the value Y = y′ if X were to take the value
X = x′ and the variables ~W were to take the values ~W = ~w′. Since the modified and
unmodified versions of AC differ only in AC2(a), it follows that both versions of the analysis
will yield the same results in such cases.
This explains why the unmodified definition AC works well in our preemption scenario,
where the binary variable C taking value C = 1 (representing Corleone’s order) is considered
as a putative cause of the binary variable D taking value D = 1 (representing McCluskey’s
death). Since, where the cause and effect variables are binary, the relevant contrasts are
selected automatically, saying that C = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1 is effectively equivalent
to saying that C = 1 rather than C = 0 is an actual cause of D = 1 rather than D = 0.
In closing this section, it is worth noting that, although the causal notion upon which
Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) focus is that of ‘actual causation’, other causal notions can
be fruitfully analysed in the SEM framework. In fact, Pearl ([2009]), Hitchcock ([2001b]), and
Woodward ([2005]) analyse a range of causal notions in terms of SEMs, including ‘net effect’
(Hitchcock [2001b], p. 372), ‘total cause’ (Woodward [2005], p. 51), ‘component effect’
(Hitchcock [2001b], pp. 374, 390–5), ‘direct cause’ (Woodward [2005], p. 55), ‘direct effect’
(Pearl [2009], pp. 126–8), and ‘contributing cause’ (Woodward [2005], p. 59). While my
interest in this paper is with ‘actual causation’ rather than these other causal notions, I do
think that there is another causal notion that is very closely related to that of actual causation,
and which can be defined simply as a corollary to (the modified) AC: namely that of
‘prevention’. I’m inclined to think that prevention is just the flip-side of actual causation.
Specifically, it seems plausible to me that, if (by the lights of the modified AC) ~X = ~x (rather
than ~X = ~x ′) is an actual cause of ϕ rather than ϕ′, then ~X = ~x (rather than ~X = ~x ′) prevents ϕ′
rather than ϕ from happening. I shall discuss the issue of probabilistic prevention in Section 8.
6 The Probabilistic Case
In attempting to analyse probabilistic actual causation, philosophers have typically appealed to
the notion of ‘probability-raising’. The idea is that, at least when circumstances are
benign—for example, when there are no preempted potential causes of the effect—an actual
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cause raises the probability of its effect.31 Turning this insight into a full-blown analysis of
probabilistic actual causation depends, among other things, upon giving an account of what it
is for circumstances to be ‘benign’ (ideally an account that does not itself appeal to actual
causation). This is part of what I shall seek to do below, drawing inspiration from Halpern and
Pearl’s account of actual causation in the deterministic case.32
But first it is worth considering in a bit more detail precisely what the notion of
‘probability-raising’ amounts to. In this context, some notation introduced by Godszmidt and
Pearl ([1992], pp. 669–70) (see also Pearl [2009], pp. 23, 70, 85) is helpful. In that notation,
do(~V = ~v) represents the set of variables ~V coming to have the values ~V = ~v as a result of
‘local surgeries’ (Pearl [2009], p. 223)—or (just as good) as a result of Woodwardian
‘interventions’ (Woodward [2005], p. 98), or Lewisian ‘small miracles’ (Lewis [1979], p.
468ff)—as opposed to the variables ~V coming to have the values ~V = ~v as a result of different
initial conditions operating via ordinary causal processes.33
Suppose that ~X = ~x is a candidate actual cause, and ϕ a putative effect of ~X = ~x. One way of
31See, for example, (Good [1961a], [1961b]), (Reichenbach [1971], p. 204), (Suppes
[1970], pp. 12, 21, 24), (Lewis [1986a], pp. 175–84), (Menzies [1989]), (Eells [1991],
Chapter 6), and (Kvart [2004]).
32Existing accounts of probabilistic actual causation—including those mentioned in the
previous footnote—are problematic, for reasons documented in (Salmon [1984], pp.
192–202), (Menzies 1996, esp. pp. 85–96), (Hitchcock [2004]), and (Glynn [2011], pp.
377–86). I shall not recount those reasons here; the interested reader is referred to the cited
works. There is one recent account of probabilistic causation—namely that developed by
Twardy and Korb ([2011])—which I will discuss in some detail in Section 9 and Section 10.
This, of all existing accounts, is the most similar in spirit to the account that I shall develop
below. In Section 10, I will outline two counterexamples to it, which my own account avoids.
33As Pearl ([2009], p. 70n) notes, do(~V = ~v) is equivalent to set(~V = ~v): the latter being
notation introduced by Pearl ([1995], pp. 673–4). Pearl ([2009], pp. 70, 70n, 127, 334) points
out that there are many alternative notations used in statistics and elsewhere to denote much
the same thing.
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cashing out the idea that the variables ~X taking the values ~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ raises the
probability of ϕ is in terms of the following inequality:
P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x)) > P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′)) (1)
This says that the probability of ϕ that would obtain if ~X were to be set to ~X = ~x by
interventions (or by ‘local surgeries’ or ‘small miracles’)34 is higher than the probability of ϕ
that would obtain if ~X were to be set to ~X = ~x ′ by interventions.35 Note that P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x))
thus represents something different from P(ϕ|~X = ~x). The latter is an ordinary conditional
probability: the probability that ϕ obtains conditional upon ~X = ~x obtaining. The former, by
contrast, represents a counterfactual probability: the probability that ϕ would obtain if the
variables ~X had been set to the values ~X = ~x by interventions
The counterfactual probability P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x)) is liable to diverge from the conditional
probability P(ϕ|~X = ~x): witness the difference between the probability of a storm conditional
upon the barometer needle pointing toward the word ‘storm’, on the one hand, and the
probability that there would be a storm if I intervened upon the barometer needle to point it
toward the word ‘storm’, on the other (cf. Pearl [2009], pp. 110–11).
One of the advantages of appealing to counterfactual probabilities rather than to conditional
probabilities in analysing actual causation is precisely that, when the counterfactuals in
question are given a suitably non-backtracking semantics (i.e. where their antecedents are
taken to be realized by interventions, small-miracles, local surgeries, or the like), we avoid
generating probability-raising relations between independent effects of a common cause (see
Lewis [1986a], p. 178). For example, the probability of a storm is higher conditional upon the
34I shall leave this parenthetical qualification implicit from now on.
35Since objective chances—which are the sort of probabilities relevant to the existence of
actual causal relations—vary over time (Lewis [1980], p. 91), the probabilities (chances)
appealed to in (1) (and indeed throughout this paper) should be taken to be those obtaining
immediately after all of the relevant interventions have occurred (cf. Lewis [1986a], p. 177).
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barometer needle pointing to the word ‘storm’ than it is conditional upon the barometer
needle’s not doing so (cf. Salmon [1984], pp. 43–4). This is not because the barometer
reading is an actual cause of the storm, but rather because an earlier fall in atmospheric
pressure is very probable conditional upon the needle of the barometer pointing toward
‘storm’ and a storm is very probable conditional upon a fall in atmospheric pressure. By
contrast, it is false that the probability of a storm would be higher if I were to intervene to
point the barometer needle toward ‘storm’ than if I were to intervene to point it toward some
other word (e.g. ‘sun’), precisely because my intervention breaks the normal association
between the atmospheric pressure and the barometer reading. Understanding
probability-raising in terms of (non-backtracking) counterfactuals thus ensures the elimination
of ‘probability-raising’ relationships that are due merely to common causes.
Another advantage of appealing to counterfactual probabilities rather than conditional
probabilities in analysing actual causation is that we retain the possibility of applying our
‘probabilistic’ analysis of actual causation to the deterministic case (cf. Lewis [1986a], pp.
178–9). Under determinism, an effect ϕ counterfactually depends upon its cause ~X = ~x when
circumstances are benign (i.e. where ϕ isn’t overdetermined, and where ~X = ~x doesn’t
preempt a potential alternative cause ~Y = ~y of ϕ). In the probabilistic case, ϕ might ‘merely’
have its probability raised by ~X = ~x in such circumstances. This is because, in the
probabilistic case, it may well be that ϕ would have had a residual background chance of
occurring, even if ~X = ~x had been absent. For example, the probability that an atom will decay
within a given interval of time can in some cases be increased by bombarding it with neutrons.
If the atom decays within the relevant time interval, then we might reasonably say that the
bombardment was an actual cause. Still, if the bombarded atom was already unstable, it is not
true that, if it hadn’t been bombarded, then it wouldn’t have decayed within the relevant time
interval: it still might have decayed (there would have been a positive—and perhaps even
reasonably high—chance of its doing so), it’s just that the probability of its doing so would
have been lower than it actually was (cf. Lewis [1986a], p. 176).
Still, if probability-raising is understood in terms of inequalities like (1), then counterfactual
dependence can be seen as a limiting case of probability-raising. Specifically, suppose that ϕ
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and ~X = ~x actually obtain and that it is true that if, due to an intervention, ~X = ~x ′ (rather than
~X = ~x) had obtained, then ¬ϕ would have obtained. Plausibly it follows that
P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′)) = 0: i.e. that if ~X = ~x ′ had obtained (due to an intervention), then the chance
of ϕ would have been zero. After all, if the chance of ϕ would have been greater than 0, then it
is not true that ¬ϕ would have obtained (Lewis [1986a], p. 176).36
Counterfactual dependence of ϕ upon ~X = ~x also requires that, if ~X = ~x had obtained, then
ϕ would have obtained. That is, it requires that ~X = ~x  ϕ (or [~X = ~x]ϕ in the notation
adopted here). But it very plausibly follows from [~X = ~x]ϕ that P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x)) > 0. Denying
this would require accepting that it could be the case that, if ~X = ~x had occurred, then ϕ would
have occurred even though the probability of ϕ occurring would have been equal to 0.37
36This is not without controversy. Lewis ([1986a], p. 176) suggests that (where A is false) a
counterfactual of the form A  ¬B (to use the symbol, , for the counterfactual connective
adopted by Lewis [1973b], pp. 1–2) entails A  P(B) = 0, at least where A and B concern
ordinary event occurrences or non-occurrences. (Lewis’s arguments apply just as well where
A and B concern the sort of variable-values that we—following others in the structural
equations tradition—are taking to be the relata of the actual causal relation.) Yet he later
(Lewis [1986b], pp. 63–5) attempted to modify his counterfactual semantics to avoid this
consequence. Hawthorne ([2005]) and Williams ([2008]) argue that his proposed modification
is problematic. Ha´jek ([unpublished]) defends the view that A  ¬B entails A  P(B) = 0,
at least where A and B concern ordinary event occurrences or non-occurrences. (Ha´jek’s
arguments also apply just as well where A and B concern variable values of the sort
considered here.) I find Ha´jek’s arguments convincing. Still, the view that counterfactual
dependence is a limiting case of probability-raising (understood in terms of inequality (1))
does not strictly require that we maintain that ~X = ~x ′ ¬ϕ (in the notation employed here:
[~X = ~x ′]¬ϕ) entails ~X = ~x ′ P(ϕ) = 0 (in the notation employed here:
P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′)) = 0). All that it does require is that, where ~X = ~x and ϕ actually hold,
~X = ~x  ϕ and ~X = ~x ′ ¬ϕ (in the notation employed here: [~X = ~x]ϕ and [~X = ~x ′]¬ϕ) are
both true only if (1) obtains. This seems extremely plausible in its own right.
37Given his assumption of Strong Centering, Lewis’s closest-worlds semantics for
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Putting these two results together, we get that where ϕ and ~X = ~x occur (which is a necessary
condition for their standing in an actual causal relation), if ϕ counterfactually depends upon its
being the case that ~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′, then inequality (1) holds. Counterfactual
dependence is thus a special case of the sort of probabilistic dependence captured by
inequality (1).
As hinted at above, we can think of analyses of deterministic actual causation in terms of
SEMs, such as Halpern and Pearl’s, as starting with the insight that effects counterfactually
depend upon their actual causes when circumstances are benign, and then giving an account of
what variables must be held fixed at which values in order to recover benign circumstances
(and therefore ‘contingent’ counterfactual dependence) even where actual circumstances are
unbenign. The probabilistic analysis of actual causation developed below starts with the idea
that effects have their probability raised by their actual causes when circumstances are benign,
and then gives an account of what variables must be held fixed at which values in order to
recover benign circumstances (and therefore ‘contingent’ probability-raising) even where
actual circumstances are unbenign.38 Given the structural analogy between the two sorts of
counterfactuals implies that a counterfactual is true if its antecedent and consequent are true
(Lewis [1973b], pp. 14–15; Lewis [1986a], p. 164). This implies that, where ~X = ~x and ϕ
actually obtain, ‘if ~X = ~x had obtained, then ϕ would obtain’ is true, even if ~X = ~x didn’t
actually result from an intervention or similar. The claim in the main text is that [~X = ~x]ϕ
implies P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x)) > 0 when these two counterfactual expressions are given a consistent
semantics: if P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x)) > 0 is to be evaluated with respect to a world in which ~X = ~x
results from an intervention, even where actually ~X = ~x, then [~X = ~x]ϕ should also be. Lewis’s
view also implies that, where actually ~X = ~x and ϕ, ‘if ~X = ~x had obtained, then ϕ would
obtain’ is true even if ϕ actually had chance < 1. (This has seemed an implausible result to
some—see Bennett [2003], esp. pp. 239–41.) But Lewis wouldn’t allow that ‘if ~X = ~x had
obtained, then ϕ would have obtained’ could be true if the probability of ϕ would have been 0.
After all, he maintains that nothing that has chance 0 actually occurs (Lewis [1986a], pp.
175–6).
38There are additional complications—to be addressed below—that arise in the
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account, with probability-raising playing the role in the one account that counterfactual
dependence plays in the other, if counterfactual dependence is a limiting case of
probability-raising, then the prospects of a unified treatment of deterministic and probabilistic
actual causation look good.
If we cashed out the notion of probability-raising, not in terms of the counterfactual
probabilities that appear in (1), but rather in terms of an inequality between conditional
probabilities—P(ϕ|~X = ~x) > P(ϕ|~X = ~x ′)—then it would be much less clear that deterministic
causation could be treated as a limiting case of probabilistic causation (cf. Lewis [1986a],
178–9). The trouble is that, under determinism, it is plausible that causes may have chance 1
of occurring (given initial conditions). Indeed, the putative causes in the deterministic
preemption scenario described in Section 2 (namely Corleone’s order and Barzini’s order)
were taken to follow deterministically from the context (and thus to have chance 1 given that
context). But where P(~X = ~x) = 1 then, where ~x , ~x ′, P(~X = ~x ′) = 0 and—according to
standard probability theory—P(ϕ|~X = ~x ′) is undefined. So our probabilistic analysis of actual
causation will run into trouble in the deterministic case if we understand the notion of
probability-raising in terms of the inequality P(ϕ|~X = ~x) > P(ϕ|~X = ~x ′). There is no such
problem if we understand probability-raising in terms of inequality (1), since the fact that
P(~X = ~x) = 1 does not imply that the counterfactual probability P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′)) (where
~x , ~x ′) is undefined.
It is worth emphasizing that, not only is P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′)) not the same as P(ϕ|~X = ~x ′), the
former isn’t a conditional probability at all. P(·|do(~X = ~x ′)) is simply a different probability
distribution than P(·): we could just as well denote these distributions ‘P1(·)’ and ‘P2(·)’. In
particular, P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′)) isn’t defined in terms of P(·) via the ratio definition of conditional
probability: that is, it is not the case that P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′)) = P(ϕ&do(~X = ~x ′))/P(do(~X = ~x ′)).
This could not be the case, since do(~X = ~x ′) (unlike ~X = ~x ′) is not an event in the probability
probabilistic case, since probability-raising under benign circumstances, though plausibly
necessary, is not sufficient for actual causation. The account developed below deals with these
cases by identifying a suitable generalization of Halpern and Pearl’s condition AC2(b) to the
probabilistic case.
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space over which P(·) is defined (see Pearl [2009], pp. 109–11, 332, 386, 421–2; Pearl [1995],
pp. 684–5; and Woodward [2005], 47–8). Rather, P(·) is the actually obtaining probability
distribution on the field of events generated by our variable setV (of which the variables in ~X
and those in ϕ are subsets), whereas P(·|do(~X = ~x ′)) is the probability distribution (on that
same field of events) that would obtain if the variables in ~X were set to the values ~X = ~x ′ by
interventions. Thus Pearl ([2009], p. 110) suggests that we can construe the intervention do(·)
as a function that takes the actual probability distribution P(·) and a possible event ~X = ~x ′ as
an input and yields the counterfactual probability distribution P(·|do(~X = ~x ′)) as an output.
I have suggested that, when circumstances are benign, actual causation might involve
probability raising. Yet actual causation (between primitive events) cannot simply be
identified with the probability raising of one event by another. This is because circumstances
aren’t always benign. Preemption cases are among the cases in which circumstances aren’t
benign. It was seen in Section 2 that deterministic preemption cases show that counterfactual
dependence (even under determinism) is not necessary for actual causation. Probabilistic
preemption cases show that probability raising is not necessary for actual causation either.
Interestingly, such cases also show that probability raising is not sufficient for actual causation
(Menzies [1989], pp. 645–7; Menzies [1996], pp. 88–9). This is in contrast to the
deterministic case, where counterfactual dependence arguably is sufficient for actual
causation. We can describe a probabilistic preemption case by simply modifying our earlier
deterministic preemption scenario. The modified scenario is as follows:
PE∗: The New York Police Department is due to go on parade at the parade
ground on Saturday. Knowing this, Don Corleone decides that, when Saturday
comes around, he will order Sonny to go to the parade ground and shoot and kill
Police Chief McCluskey. Not knowing Corleone’s plan, Don Barzini decides that,
when Saturday comes around, he will order Turk to shoot and kill McCluskey. To
simplify, suppose that each of the following chances is negligible: the chance of
each of the dons not issuing his order given his intention to do so, the chance of
Turk or Sonny shooting McCluskey if not ordered to do so, the chance of
McCluskey dying unless he is hit by either Turk’s or Sonny’s bullet, and the
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chance of Turk shooting if Sonny shoots. Suppose that Sonny is a fairly obedient
type, and that his opportunity to shoot will (with chance ≈ 1) come earlier than
Turk’s (since Corleone’s headquarters are closer to the police parade ground than
Barzini’s headquarters). Let us assume that, given Corleone’s order, there is a 0.9
chance that Sonny will shoot McCluskey. Sonny, however, is not a great shot and,
if he shoots, there’s only a 0.5 chance that he’ll hit and kill McCluskey. Turk is
also obedient, but will (with chance ≈ 1) have the opportunity to shoot only if
Sonny doesn’t shoot (even if Sonny shoots and misses, McCluskey will almost
certainly be whisked away to safety before Turk gets a chance to shoot). But if
Barzini issues his order and Sonny does not shoot, then there is a 0.9 chance that
Turk will shoot. And, if Turk shoots, there is a 0.9 chance that he will hit and kill
McCluskey. Suppose that, in actual fact, both Corleone and Barzini issue their
orders. Sonny arrives at the parade ground first, shooting and killing McCluskey.
Turk arrives on the scene afterward, and doesn’t shoot.
Intuitively, just as in the deterministic scenario, Corleone’s order was a cause of McCluskey’s
death, while Barzini’s order was not a cause. Still, the chance of McCluskey’s death if
Corleone issued his order was:
P(D = 1|do(C = 1)) ≈ (0.9 × 0.5) + (0.1 × (0.9 × 0.9)) = (0.45) + (0.081) = 0.531 (2)
That is (given the stipulations of the example) the chance of McCluskey’s death if Corleone
issues his order is approximately equal to the probability that Sonny shoots if Corleone issues
his order (0.9) times the probability that Sonny hits and kills McCluskey if he shoots (0.5) plus
the probability that Sonny doesn’t shoot if Corleone issues his order (0.1) times the product of
the probability that Turk shoots if Sonny doesn’t (0.9) and the probability that Turk hits and
kills McCluskey if he shoots (0.9).
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By contrast, the chance of McCluskey’s death if Corleone had not issued his order is:
P(D = 1|do(C = 0)) ≈ 0.9 × 0.9 = 0.81 (3)
That is (given the stipulations of the example), the chance of McCluskey’s death if Corleone
had not issued his order is approximately equal to the chance that Turk would shoot if Barzini
issued his order and Sonny had not shot (0.9) times the probability that Turk would hit and kill
McCluskey if he shot (0.9).
It is worth noting that, in evaluating these probabilities, there is no need to explicitly hold
fixed the context—namely the intentions of the dons to issue their orders, CI = 1&BI = 1—by
including it as an argument in the do(.) function in the counterfactual probability expressions
that appear on the left hand side of the approximate equalities (2) and (3) (so that the
expression on the left hand side of (3), for example, becomes
P(D = 1|do(C = 0&CI = 1&BI = 1))). This is because the context is already implicitly held
fixed in virtue of the non-backtracking nature of the counterfactuals. In evaluating the
counterfactual probability expressed by (3), for example, we are to consider a world in which
C is set to C = 0 by an intervention (or local surgery or small miracle) which leaves the
context, CI = 1&BI = 1, undisturbed. The same point applies to all of the counterfactual
probabilities considered below.
It follows immediately from (2) and (3) that, in spite of our intuitive judgement that
Corleone’s order was a cause of McCluskey’s death, the former actually lowers the probability
of the latter. Specifically:
P(D = 1|do(C = 1)) ≈ 0.531 < 0.81 ≈ P(D = 1|do(C = 0)) (4)
Intuitively, the reason why Corleone’s order lowers the probability of McCluskey’s death is
that Turk is by far the more competent assassin, and a botched assassination attempt by the
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relatively incompetent Sonny would prevent Turk from getting an opportunity to attempt the
assassination. So, although Corleone’s order was an actual cause of McCluskey’s death
(because Sonny succeeded), Corleone’s order lowered the probability of McCluskey’s death
(because it raised the probability that Sonny would carry out a botched attempt that would
prevent the far more competent Turk from taking a shot). The example thus illustrates the
well-known fact that causes need not raise the probability of their effects.39
Also well-known is the fact that an event can have its probability raised by another event
that is not among its causes.40 The above example illustrates this phenomenon too. Since
Corleone and Barzini issue their orders independently, and since (in the context, in which they
both form the intention to do so) each does so with a probability of approximately 1, the
probability of McCluskey’s death if Barzini issues his order is approximately equal to the
probability of McCluskey’s death if Corleone issues his order. That is:
P(D = 1|do(B = 1)) ≈ P(D = 1|do(C = 1)) ≈ 0.531 (5)
However the probability of McCluskey’s death if Barzini had not issued his order is
approximately equal to the probability that Sonny shoots if Corleone orders him to (0.9)
39Three of the earliest philosophical discussions of the phenomenon of actual causation
without probability raising are to be found in (Good [1961a], p. 318), (Hesslow [1976], p.
291), and (Rosen [1978], pp. 607–8).
40By adopting—as I have done here—a conception of probability raising that (a` la causal
decision theory and the approaches to probabilistic causation adopted by Lewis [1986a], pp.
175–84 and Menzies [1989], pp. 644–5, 653–7) involves counterfactual probabilities (where
the counterfactuals are given a non-backtracking semantics), as opposed to conditional
probabilities, we avoid cases of probability raising non-causation that arise when two events
are independent effects of a third. Yet, as the present example illustrates (see the main text
below), the phenomenon of an event having its probability raised by a non-cause is far from
being confined to such cases.
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multiplied by the probability that Sonny hits and kills McCluskey if he shoots (0.5). That is:
P(D = 1|do(B = 0)) ≈ 0.9 × 0.5 = 0.45 (6)
It follows immediately from (5) and (6) that Barzini’s order raises the probability of
McCluskey’s death. Specifically:
P(D = 1|do(B = 1)) ≈ 0.531 > 0.45 ≈ P(D = 1|do(B = 0)) (7)
Intuitively, the reason that Barzini’s order raises the probability of McCluskey’s death is that
there is some chance that Sonny will fail to shoot and, in such circumstances, given Barzini’s
order, there is a (fairly high) chance that Turk will shoot and kill McCluskey instead. Since
Barzini’s order is nevertheless not an actual cause of McCluskey’s death, the example thus
illustrates the fact that probability raising isn’t sufficient for actual causation (even when we
understand probability raising in terms of non-backtracking counterfactuals so as to eliminate
the influence of common causes),41 as well as not being necessary.
That probability-raising is neither necessary nor sufficient for actual causation creates a
difficulty for existing attempts to analyse probabilistic actual causation (see Hitchcock
[2004]). And, as it stands, Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC does not give the correct
diagnosis of probabilistic pre-emption cases like the one just described. In particular, it fails to
diagnose Corleone’s order as a cause of McCluskey’s death. The reason is that it is no longer
true (as it was in the deterministic pre-emption case considered above) that, as condition
AC2(a) requires, (i) given Turk’s non-shooting (and Barzini’s issuing his order), McCluskey’s
41For further illustrations that this is so, see (Hitchcock [2004], pp. 410–11, 415), (Menzies
[1989], pp. 645–7), (Edgington [1997], p. 419), (Lewis [2004], pp. 79–80), and (Schaffer
[2000], p. 41).
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death counterfactually depends upon Corleone’s order. After all, if Corleone hadn’t issued his
order, and (Barzini had issued his order but) Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey might still
have died (from a heart attack, say). I said that the chance of his dying in these circumstances
was negligible, but not that it was zero.42 Moreover, I made the assumption of a negligible
probability of his dying in such a situation only for calculational simplicity. In a probabilistic
context, one can revise the example so that the probability is rather large, while still ensuring
that Corleone’s order is a non-probability-raising cause, and Barzini’s order is a probability
raising non-cause of McCluskey’s death.43
Moreover, since the Corleone-process is now only probabilistic, it is not true, as condition
AC2(b) requires, that (ii) if Corleone had issued his order, and (Barzini had issued his order
but) Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey would have died. After all, in the probabilistic case,
there is some chance that Sonny doesn’t shoot even if Corleone issues his order: it was a
stipulation of the example that the chance of Sonny shooting if Corleone issues his order is
42Indeed, what is negligible is context-sensitive. In a context in which we were simply
calculating approximate probability values, it was acceptable to neglect this small probability,
but I take it that this is not acceptable when evaluating counterfactuals (cf. Lewis [1986a], p.
176). For a detailed argument that such probabilities cannot properly be neglected (no matter
what the context) in evaluating counterfactuals, see (Ha´jek [unpublished], Section 5.1).
43Even if we don’t accept that A  ¬B implies A  P(B) = 0 (see Footnote 36 above), it
seems plausible to maintain that A  ¬B implies that if A obtained, then the probability of B
would not have been large (at least where, as is the case for the counterfactual under
consideration in the main text, the antecedent is false). In fact, all that is needed to establish
that Halpern and Pearl’s analysis is not fully adequate to the probabilistic case is the still
weaker claim that sometimes when one event is a probabilistic cause of another it is not the
case that the latter exhibits contingent counterfactual dependence upon the former (because,
under the relevant contingency, the latter would have retained some degree of probability of
occurring even if the former hadn’t). Even defenders of the compatibility of A  ¬B and
A  P(B) , 0 (for false A), such as Lewis ([1986b], pp. 63–5) and Williams ([2008], pp.
405–19) develop counterfactual semantics that make this weaker claim plausible.
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only 0.9. There is also some chance that Sonny fails to kill McCluskey even if he does shoot:
it was a stipulation of the example that the chance of McCluskey dying if Sonny shoots is only
around 0.5. So it is not true that if Corleone had issued his order, and Turk hadn’t shot, then
McCluskey would have died: the chance of his dying under such circumstances is only
(approximately) 0.9 × 0.5 = 0.45.44 So, in general, Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC does not
(and is not intended to) deliver the correct results in the probabilistic case.
Nevertheless, it seems prima facie plausible that Halpern and Pearl’s account might be
extended to provide a satisfactory treatment of probabilistic actual causation by substituting its
appeals to contingent counterfactual dependence with appeals to contingent
probability-raising. Specifically, one might maintain that Corleone’s order was a cause of
McCluskey’s death because (i) given Turk’s non-shooting (and Barzini’s order), Corleone’s
order raised the probability of McCluskey’s death: after all, given Turk’s non-shooting, the
probability of McCluskey’s death would have been lower (≈ 0) if Corleone hadn’t issued his
44I assume that A  B is incompatible with A  P(¬B) = 0.55. One might deny this if
one thinks that true-antecedent and true-consequent counterfactuals are automatically true as
Lewis ([1986a], p. 164), somewhat controversially, does (see the discussion of Footnote 37,
above). Indeed, the specific counterfactual presently under discussion—‘If Corleone had
issued his order, and Barzini had issued his order but Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey would
have died’—is a true-antecedent and true-consequent counterfactual. But this is just because
the contingency that we need to appeal to in this case—that in which Barzini issues his order
but Turk doesn’t shoot—happens to be actual. For reasons outlined in Footnote 24 above, it is
sometimes necessary to appeal to non-actual contingencies in identifying the contingent
counterfactual dependence of effect upon cause required by condition AC2(a). Where this is
so, the counterfactual appealed to in AC2(b) will not be a true-antecedent and true-consequent
counterfactual. And all that is needed to establish that Halpern and Pearl’s analysis is not fully
adequate to the probabilistic case is that sometimes when one event is a probabilistic cause of
another it is not the case that (under the relevant contingency, which may be non-actual) the
latter would have occurred if the former had (because, under the relevant contingency, the
latter would have retained some probability of not occurring even if the former had occurred).
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order, than if he had (≈ 0.45). Moreover, (ii) there is a complete probabilistic causal process
running from Corleone’s order to McCluskey’s death as indicated by the fact that, for arbitrary
subsets of events on the Corleone-process, it is true that given that Turk didn’t shoot (and
Barzini issued his order), if Corleone had shot, and those events had occurred, then the
probability of McCluskey’s death would have remained higher than it would have been if
Corleone hadn’t issued his order.
By contrast, plausibly Barzini’s order isn’t an actual cause because, while it is true that (i)
given Sonny’s not shooting (and Corleone’s issuing his order), Barzini’s order raised the
probability of McCluskey’s death—specifically, given Sonny’s non-shooting, the probability
of McCluskey’s death would have been lower (≈ 0) if Barzini hadn’t issued his order than if
he had (≈ 0.81)—it is nevertheless not true that (ii) there is a complete probabilistic causal
process from Barzini’s order to McCluskey’s death, as indicated by the fact that, for example,
if Sonny hadn’t shot (and Corleone had issued his order) and (as was actually the case) Barzini
issued his order but Turk didn’t shoot, then the probability of McCluskey’s death would have
been no higher than if Barzini hadn’t issued his order in the first place.
In order to render this suggestion more precise, it will be necessary to appeal to the notion
of a probabilistic causal model.
7 Probabilistic Causal Models
As noted in the previous section, Pearl ([2009], p. 110) suggests that we can construe do(·) as
a function that takes a probability distribution and a formula of the form ~X = ~x ′ as an input
and yields a new probability distribution, P(·|do(~X = ~x ′)), as an output. Thinking of do(·) in
these terms, we can construe a probabilistic causal model,M∗, as an ordered triple
〈V, P, do(·)〉 whereV is a set of variables, P is a probability distribution defined on the field
of events generated by the variables inV, and do(·) is a function that, when P and any formula
the form ~V ′ = ~v ′ for ~V ′ ⊆ V are taken as its inputs, yields as an output a new distribution
P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′))—the probability distribution that would result from intervening upon the
variables ~V ′ to set their values equal to ~V ′ = ~v ′.
The variable setV can be partitioned into a set of exogenous variablesU and a set of
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endogenous variables Y. In the probabilistic context, an exogenous variable U ∈ U is one
such that for no possible value u of U is there a pair of possible value assignments,
{~T = ~t ′, ~T = ~t ′′}, to the variables in ~T = V\U such that
P(U = u|do(~T = ~t ′)) , P(U = u|do(~T = ~t ′′)). That is, U is exogenous if and only if the
probability of none of the possible values of U is affected by interventions on the values of the
other variables inV. The endogenous variablesV are the variables that are not exogenous.
An assignment of values ~u to the variables ~U in the setU of exogenous variables, denoted
~U = ~u, is (once again) called a ‘context’.
It was observed in Section 3 that Hitchcock ([2001a], p. 287) takes it to be a condition for
the ‘appropriateness’ of an SEM,M, that it “entail no false counterfactuals”, by which he
means that evaluating counterfactuals with respect toM by means of the ‘equation
replacement’ method doesn’t lead to evaluations of counterfactuals as true when they are in
fact false (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 283). We can make an analogous requirement of
probabilistic causal models. Specifically, whereM∗ = 〈V, P, do(·)〉 is our probabilistic causal
model, it should be required that, for any formula the form ~V ′ = ~v ′ such that ~V ′ ⊆ V, the
distribution P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)) that the function do(·) yields as an output (when P and ~V ′ = ~v ′
are its inputs) should be the true objective chance distribution on the field of events generated
by the variables inV that would result from intervening upon the variables ~V ′ to set their
values equal to ~V ′ = ~v ′.45
45One might think that, where ϕ is a primitive event or a Boolean combination of primitive
events in the field generated byV, P(ϕ|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)) could be a well-defined objective chance
only if ~V ′ includes ‘enough’ variables. For example, one might think that ~V ′ must include all
of the exogenous variables ~U, so that ~V ′ = ~v ′ incorporates a complete specification of the
context ~U = ~u, if P(ϕ|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)) is to express a well-defined objective chance for ϕ.
(Though Hitchcock ([unpublished], Section 14) suggests that, under certain conditions,
specifying the values of certain sets of variables that do not include all of the variables in ~U
may also yield a chance value for ϕ.) Moreover, one might think that the set of exogenous
variables must be fairly rich if P(ϕ|do( ~U = ~u)) is to express an objective chance (for all
Boolean combinations ϕ of primitive events in the field generated by the variables inV and
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In modelling our probabilistic preemption scenario, we can take the variable set to comprise
the variables CI, BI, C, B, S , T , and D, where these variables all have the same possible
values (with the same interpretations) as they did in the deterministic case. To be
‘appropriate’, our probabilistic causal model 〈{CI, BI,C, B, S ,T,D}, P, do(·)〉 should satisfy
the requirement described in the previous paragraph: namely that, where
for all possible values ~u of ~U). One might therefore think that it ought to be taken as a
requirement of model ‘appropriateness’ that the set of exogenous variables be ‘rich enough’ to
generate such chances.
However, I think that this line of thought is misguided. First of all, as noted in Section 6
above, if the value of an exogenous variable in the model is not included in the scope of the
do(·) operator that appears in the relevant counterfactual probabilities, then by default this
variable is held fixed at its actual value in virtue of the non-backtracking nature of the
counterfactual. Consequently a complete context is always held fixed either implicitly or
explicitly (or part-implicitly and part-explicitly) in evaluating such counterfactual
probabilities. Secondly, the non-backtracking nature of the counterfactuals means that even
the values of variables that are not included in the model, but which represent events occurring
prior to the putative cause, are implicitly held fixed at their actual values when the
counterfactual is evaluated (just as earlier atmospheric conditions are implicitly held fixed in
evaluating counterfactuals concerning what would happen if the reading of a certain barometer
had been different). Consequently, even if the set of exogenous variables in the model is
relatively impoverished, the extra background needed to generate an objective chance is
implicitly taken into account when the counterfactual is evaluated.
Finally, it is worth noting that I am here taking objective chances to attach to the values of
high-level variables (i.e. variables that do not represent fundamental physical events), given
the values of certain other high-level variables. There is a range of plausible interpretations of
objective chance that allow for such chances. These include the accounts of Loewer ([2001]),
Hoefer ([2007]), Frigg and Hoefer ([2010], [forthcoming]), Ismael ([2009], [2012]), Glynn
([2010]), Frisch ([2014]), Emery ([2015]), and List and Pivato ([2015]). Any of these accounts
would do for present purposes. Interestingly, on each of these accounts, the existence of
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V = {CI, BI,C, B, S ,T,D}, for any formula of the form ~V ′ = ~v ′ such that ~V ′ ⊆ V, the
distribution P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)) that the function do(·) yields as an output (when P and ~V ′ = ~v ′
are its inputs) should be the true objective chance distribution on the field of events generated
by the variables inV that would result from intervening upon the variables ~V ′ to set their
values equal to ~V ′ = ~v ′. Since I am assuming the probabilities described in the probabilistic
preemption example (as outlined in the previous section) to be objective chances, these
probabilities should be among those that result from the appropriate inputs to do(·).
We can construct a graphical representation of a probabilistic model 〈V, P, do(·)〉 by taking
the variables inV as the nodes or vertices of the graph and drawing a directed edge (‘arrow’)
from a variable Vi to a variable V j (Vi,V j ∈ V) just in case, where ~S = V\Vi,V j, there is some
assignment of values ~S = ~s ′, some pair of possible values {vi, v′i} (vi , v′i) of Vi, and some
possible value v j of V j such that
P(V j = v j|do(Vi = vi&~S = ~s ′)) , P(V j = v j|do(Vi = v′i&~S = ~s ′)). That is, an arrow is drawn
from Vi to V j just in case there is some assignment of values to other variables inV such that
the value of Vi makes a difference to the probability distribution over the values of V j when the
other variables inV take the assigned values. As in the deterministic case, where there is an
arrow from Vi to V j, Vi is said to be a parent of V j, and V j to be a child of Vi. Once again,
ancestorhood is defined in terms of the transitive closure of parenthood, and descendanthood
in terms of the transitive closure of childhood.
The result of applying this convention to the model of our probabilistic preemption scenario
is, once again (and not by accident), the graph given as Figure 1 (in Section 5, above).
Previously a directed edge from a variable Vi to a variable V j represented the fact that there is
some pair of possible values {vi, v′i} (vi , v′i) of Vi, some pair of possible values {v j, v′j}
(v j , v′j) of V j and some assignment ~S = ~s
′ of values to the variables ~S = V\{Vi,V j} such
that, if we held ~S fixed at ~S = ~s ′ by interventions, then an intervention to set Vi = vi would
result in V j = v j, while an intervention to set Vi = v′i would result in V j = v
′
j. Now it represents
the fact that there is a pair of possible values {vi, v′i} (vi , v′i) of Vi, some possible value v j of
V j and some assignment ~S = ~s ′ of values to the variables ~S = V\{Vi,V j} such that, if we held
high-level objective chances isn’t dependent upon fundamental physics being indeterministic.
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fixed ~S = ~s ′ by interventions, then the probability of V j = v j would be different depending on
whether we intervened to set Vi = vi or Vi = v′i . As seen in Section 6 above, the former case is
arguably just a special case of the latter: namely, the case in which the probability of V j = v j
would be 1 if we intervened to set Vi = vi, but 0 if we intervened to set Vi = v′i (while holding
fixed, by interventions, ~S = ~s ′).
I have so far implicitly been supposing that a probabilistic causal model,M∗ = 〈V, P, do(·)〉
‘summarises’ a set of counterfactuals about what the probability distribution overV would
have been if any subset ~V ′ of the variables inV had taken any possible set of values ~V ′ = ~v ′.
These counterfactuals are expressed by formulas of the form P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)). Indeed,
construing do(·) as a function that takes a probability distribution and a formula of the form
~V ′ = ~v ′ as inputs and yields a counterfactual probability distribution P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)) as an
output, I suggested that a modelM∗ = 〈V, P, do(·)〉 is appropriate only if, where P and
~V ′ = ~v ′ are the inputs to do(·), the outputted distribution P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)) is the chance
distribution that truly would obtain if it had been that ~V ′ = ~v ′. This, as I suggested, is
analogous to Hitchcock’s requirement that an ‘appropriate’ deterministic SEM “entail no false
counterfactuals” (Hitchcock 2001a, 287). Both requirements commit the requirer to a
semantics for counterfactuals that is independent of the model in question. As suggested in the
earlier discussion of deterministic SEMs, a semantics along the lines of those given by Lewis
([1979]) or Woodward ([2005]) would fill the bill.
Still, as discussed in Section 3, it is possible to regard deterministic SEMs as representing
causal mechanisms, which are taken as primitive, rather than as simply summarizing
counterfactuals. The same is true of probabilistic causal models. On this view, a probabilistic
causal model is construed as an ordered triple 〈V, P,G〉, where (as before)V is a set of
variables and P is a probability distribution defined on the field of events generated by those
variables, but where G is a graph with the variables inV as its nodes. On this approach, it is
typically required that the pair 〈P,G〉 obey the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) (Spirtes et al.
[2000], pp. 29–30): namely that each variable V ∈ V is probabilistically independent of its
non-descendants given the values of its parents (where the variables that count as descendants
of V and those that count as parents of V is evaluated with respect to G). The edges in G are
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taken to represent causal mechanisms, interventions are defined (contra Woodward [2005], p.
98) in terms of manipulations of G (Spirtes et al. [2000], pp. 47–53), and a semantics for
counterfactuals (whose consequents concern the probabilities of primitive events or Boolean
combinations of primitive events in the field generated by the variables inV) is given (with
the aid of the CMC) in terms of these manipulations of G (Spirtes et al. [2000], pp. 47–53).
As Woodward puts it, this alternative approach “defines the notion of an intervention with
respect to the correct causal graph for the system in which the intervention occurs”
(Woodward [2005], p. 110). Consequently Woodward points out that, unlike his own
approach, it does not “give us a notion of intervention that can be used to provide an
interpretation for what it is for such a graph to be correct” (Woodward [2005], p. 110).
So, in other words, this alternative approach, which construes a probabilistic causal model
as a triple 〈V, P,G〉 takes a (causal-mechanism-representing) graph G as basic, and seeks to
define in terms of G (with the help of the assumption that the CMC is satisfied by the pair
〈P,G〉) a function—which can be denoted do(·) and called an ‘intervention’—which takes the
probability distribution P and any conjunction, ~V ′ = ~v ′, of primitive events in the field
generated byV as inputs, and yields as an output a new probability distribution
P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)). The ‘summaries of counterfactuals’ view, by contrast, construes a
probabilistic causal model as an ordered triple 〈V, P, do(·)〉, thus taking the function
do(·)—which takes a probability distribution and a conjunction, ~V ′ = ~v ′, of primitive events in
the field generated byV as inputs, and yields as an output a new probability distribution
P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′))—as a primitive, and takes it as a requirement of ‘appropriateness’ that (when
P and ~V ′ = ~v ′ are the inputs) the outputted distribution P(·|do(~V ′ = ~v ′)) is the chance
distribution that truly would obtain if the variables ~V ′ were set to the values ~V ′ = ~v ′ by
interventions (where now the notion of an ‘intervention’ is taken to be independently
defined—see Woodward [2005], p. 98) or alternatively by ‘small miracles’. A ‘correct’
graphical representation of the model can then be given in accordance with the conventions
described above.
If probabilistic causal models are taken to summarize counterfactuals (in this case
counterfactuals about probabilities), then the possibility of giving a reductive account of actual
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causation in terms of probabilistic causal models is retained. But the account will be reductive
only if the counterfactuals are given a semantics (perhaps along the lines of that given by
Lewis [1986b], esp. Postscript D) that does not appeal to causal notions. It will not be fully
reductive if the counterfactuals are given a semantics that appeals to causal notions, such as
Woodward’s notion of an intervention (Woodward [2005], p. 98). But, even in that case, it
may still be illuminating for the reasons that were discussed in Section 3 in connection with
analyses of actual causation in terms of deterministic SEMs that are taken to summarize
interventionist counterfactuals. Similarly, if probabilistic causal models are instead taken to
have a graph representing causal mechanisms among their primitives, then analyses of actual
causation in terms of probabilistic causal models may be illuminating for much the same
reasons as analyses of actual causation in terms of deterministic SEMs are illuminating even
where structural equations are construed as representing causal mechanisms. But they will not
be fully reductive. The analysis of probabilistic actual causation to be advanced in the next
section is compatible with either of these views of probabilistic causal models.
8 A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition
With the notion of a probabilistic causal model, discussed in the previous section, in place we
are now in a position to modify Halpern and Pearl’s definition so that it can handle
probabilistic preemption. Specifically, suppose thatM∗ is a probabilistic causal model and
that ~u is the actual context: that is, it is the set of values that the exogenous variables inM∗
have in the actual world (or, more generally, the world of evaluation). The analysis that I wish
to propose as the natural extension of Halpern and Pearl’s definition to the case of
probabilistic actual causation is as follows:46
46Like Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC, this definition relativizes the notion of ‘actual
causation’ to a model (in this case a probabilistic model). If one takes model-relativity to be
an objectionable feature, then one could avoid it by saying that ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ
simpliciter provided that there exists at least one ‘appropriate’ probabilistic causal model
relative to which PC is satisfied (cf. Section 4, above). Most of the criteria for an ‘appropriate’
deterministic SEM that have been advanced in the literature (see Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287;
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(PC) ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M∗, ~u) (i.e. in modelM∗ given context ~u) if and only if
the following three conditions hold:
PC1. Both ~X = ~x and ϕ are true in the actual world (or, more generally, the world of
evaluation).
PC2. There exists a partition (~Z, ~W) of Y (i.e. the set of endogenous variables in the model
M∗) with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x ′, ~w ′) of the variables in (~X, ~W) such that where, in
the actual world, Zi = z∗i for all Zi ∈ ~Z, the following holds:
(a) P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x& ~W = ~w ′)) > P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′& ~W = ~w ′)). In words, if the variables
in ~W had taken the values ~W = ~w ′, then the probability of ϕ would be higher if the
variables in ~X took the values ~X = ~x than if the variables in ~X took the values
~X = ~x ′.
(b) P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x& ~W = ~w ′&~Z′ = ~z ∗)) > P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′& ~W = ~w ′)) for all subsets ~Z′
of ~Z. In words, if the variables in ~W had taken the values ~W = ~w ′ and the variables
in ~X had taken the values ~X = ~x and all of the variables in an arbitrary subset of ~Z
had taken their actual values, then the probability of ϕ would still have been higher
than if the variables in ~W had taken the values ~W = ~w ′ and the variables in ~X had
taken the values ~X = ~x ′.
PC3. ~X is minimal; no strict subset ~X′ of ~X is such that if ~X is replaced by ~X′ in PC2, then no
change to the values of the counterfactual probabilities that are appealed to in PC2
results. Minimality ensures that only those elements of the conjunction ~X = ~x that are
relevant to the probabilities of ϕ appealed to in PC2 are considered part of a cause;
inessential elements are pruned.
In the probabilistic preemption case described in Section 6 above, PC correctly counts C = 1
as an actual cause of D = 1. To see this, note that the actual context (that is, the set of actual
Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], esp. pp. 394–9; and Blanchard and Schaffer [forthcoming],
Section 1) apply just as well to probabilistic causal models.
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values of the exogenous variables) is simply ~u = {CI = 1, BI = 1}. Let ~X = {C}, with
~x = {C = 1} and ~x ′ = {C = 0}. Let ϕ be D = 1. In the actual world, C = 1 and D = 1, so
condition PC1 is satisfied. If PC2 is satisfied, then PC3 will also be satisfied because ~X = {C}
has no (non-empty) subsets and, if PC2(a) is satisfied, then this implies that, in the
circumstances ~W = ~w ′, the values of the variables in ~X = {C} make a difference to the
probability of ϕ. So everything hinges on whether PC2 is satisfied.
To see that PC2 is satisfied, let ~Z = 〈C, S ,D〉, let ~W = 〈B,T 〉, and let ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0}.
First note that PC2(a) is satisfied because:
P(D = 1|do(C = 1&B = 1&T = 0)) > P(D = 1|do(C = 0&B = 1&T = 0)) (8)
This says that the probability that McCluskey would have died if Corleone had issued his
order, Barzini had issued his order, but Turk hadn’t shot is greater than the probability that
McCluskey would have died if Corleone had not issued his order, Barzini had issued his order,
but Turk hadn’t shot. In fact, given the stipulations of the example, the former probability is
approximately 0.45, while the latter is approximately 0. It is important to bear in mind here
the non-backtracking nature of the counterfactuals: in particular, the probabilities are those
that would obtain if Turk’s not shooting were brought about by an intervention, small miracle,
or local surgery which does not affect whether or not Sonny shoots. This is what is indicated
by the do(·) operator.
To see that PC2(b) is satisfied, note that if it had been the case that C = 1, B = 1, and T = 0,
then the probability of D = 1 would have been higher, even if S had taken its actual value
S = 1, than it would have been if C = 0, B = 1, and T = 0. That is:
P(D = 1|do(C = 1&B = 1&T = 0&S = 1)) > P(D = 1|do(C = 0&B = 1&T = 0)) (9)
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This says that if Barzini had issued his order but Turk hadn’t shot, then the probability of
McCluskey’s death would have been higher if Corleone issued his order even if Sonny had
shot, than it would have been if Corleone hadn’t issued his order. Indeed, given the
stipulations of the example, the former probability is approximately 0.5, while the latter is
approximately 0.
So PC2(b) is satisfied. We have already seen that PC1 and PC2(a) are satisfied, and that
PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is. Consequently, definition PC yields the correct verdict that C = 1 is
an actual (probabilistic) cause of D = 1.
Definition PC also yields the intuitive verdict that B = 1 (Barzini’s order) is not an actual
cause of D = 1. In order to get the sort of contingent probabilistic dependence of D = 1 upon
B = 1 required by condition PC2(a), it will be necessary to include in the antecedents of the
relevant counterfactuals the fact that at least one variable on the Corleone-process—that is,
either C or S —takes (the non-actual value) 0. The trouble is that, in such circumstances, if B
and T took their actual values B = 1 and T = 0, then the probability of D = 1 would be no
higher than if B took the value B = 0. This is contrary to the requirement of condition PC2(b).
For example, consider the obvious partition ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉 and ~W = 〈C, S 〉, and consider the
assignment ~w ′ = 〈C = 1, S = 0〉. Condition PC2(a) is satisfied for this partition and this
assignment. In particular, it is true that:
P(D = 1|do(B = 1&C = 1&S = 0)) > P(D = 1|do(B = 0&C = 1&S = 0)) (10)
That is to say, in circumstances in which Corleone issues his order, but Sonny doesn’t shoot,
the probability of McCluskey’s dying would be higher if Barzini issued his order than if
Barzini didn’t issue his order. Given the stipulations of our example, the former probability is
approximately 0.81, while the latter is approximately 0.
But notice that PC2(b) is not satisfied for this partition and assignment of values to ~W. For
take ~Z′ = {T } ⊂ ~Z, and observe that:
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P(D = 1|do(B = 1&C = 1&S = 0&T = 0)) ≤ P(D = 1|do(B = 0&C = 1&S = 0)) (11)
That is to say, in circumstances in which Corleone issued his order but Sonny didn’t shoot, if
(as was actually the case) Barzini issued his order, but Turk didn’t shoot, the probability of
McCluskey’s death would have been no higher than it would have been if Barzini hadn’t
issued his order in the first place. Intuitively this is because, in circumstances where Corleone
issues his order but Sonny doesn’t shoot, Barzini’s order only raises the probability of
McCluskey’s death because it raises the probability of Turk’s shooting. So (in circumstances
in which Corleone issues his order but Sonny doesn’t shoot) the probability of McCluskey’s
death if Barzini had issued his order but Turk had not shot would have been no higher than if
(in the same circumstances) Barzini simply hadn’t issued his order.
Nor is there any other partition (~Z, ~W) of the endogenous variables {C, B, S ,T,D} such that
PC2 is satisfied. In particular, none of the remaining variables on the Barzini-process {T,D}
can be assigned to ~W instead of ~Z if PC2(a) is to be satisfied, for the values of each of these
variables ‘screens off’ B from D, so the result would be that PC2(a) wouldn’t hold for any
assignment ~w ′ of values to variables in ~W. On the other hand, reassigning all or some of the
variables on the initial Corleone-process {C, S } to ~Z will not affect the fact that PC2(b) fails to
obtain. This is because no matter what subset of {C, S } we take ~W to comprise, and no matter
what values ~w ′ are assigned to that subset by interventions, the probabilistic relevance of B to
D remains entirely by way of its relevance to T . So it will remain true that, where ~W = ~w ′, if
B = 1 and T = 0, then the probability of D = 1 would be no higher than if B = 0, in violation
of PC2(b). (Again, it is important to remember that the relevant worlds where ~W = ~w ′ and
B = 1 and T = 0 hold are those in which T has the value T = 0 as the result of an intervention
or similar, rather than T ’s value being influenced in the usual way by the value of S .)
So PC gives the correct diagnosis of probabilistic pre-emption. It does so on intuitively the
correct grounds. Specifically, the reason that Corleone’s order is counted as a cause is that (i)
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given Turk’s non-shooting, Corleone’s order raised the probability of McCluskey’s death; and
(ii) there is a complete causal process running from Corleone’s order to McCluskey’s death as
indicated by the fact that, for arbitrary subsets of events on the Corleone-process, it is true that
if Corleone had issued his order, and Turk hadn’t shot, and the variables representing those
events had taken their actual values, then the probability of McCluskey’s death would have
remained higher than if Corleone had never issued his order in the first place.
By contrast, Barzini’s order isn’t counted as a cause because, although (i) given Sonny’s
non-shooting, Barzini’s order would raise the probability of McCluskey’s death; nevertheless
(ii) there is no complete causal process from Barzini’s order to McCluskey’s death as
indicated by the fact that, if Barzini had issued his order and Sonny hadn’t shot but (as was
actually the case) Turk didn’t shoot, then the probability of McCluskey’s death would have
been no higher than it would have been if (Sonny hadn’t shot and) Barzini hadn’t issued his
order in the first place.
It was noted above that Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 859) suggest that their definition AC
might reasonably be adjusted in light of the contrastive nature of many causal claims. Indeed,
as noted above, several philosophers have argued rather convincingly that actual causation is
contrastive in nature (e.g. Hitchcock [1996a], [1996b]; Schaffer [2005], [2013]): specifically,
that causation is a quaternary relation, with the cause, the effect, a set of alternatives to the
cause, and a set of alternatives to the effect as its relata. In the present context, this would
mean that the primary analysandum is not ‘~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ’, but rather ‘~X = ~x
rather than ~X = ~x ′ is an actual cause of ϕ rather than ϕ′’, where ~X = ~x ′ denotes a set of
formulas of the form ~X = ~x ′ such that, for each such formula, ~x , ~x ′, and where ϕ′ represents
a set of formulas of the form ϕ′ such that, for each such formula, ϕ is incompatible with ϕ′.
The case for turning PC into an analysis of a four-place relation is just as compelling as the
case for the corresponding modification of AC. As it stands, where the cause and/or effect
variables are multi-valued, PC (just like the unmodified AC) is liable to run into difficulties.
Consider a case where Doctor can administer either no dose, one dose, or two doses of
Medicine to Patient. Let M be a variable that takes value M = 0 if no dose is administered,
M = 1 if one dose is administered, and M = 2 if two doses are administered. Suppose that
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Patient will recover with chance 0.1 if no dose is administered, with chance 0.9 if one dose is
administered, and with chance 0.5 if two doses are administered (two doses is an ‘overdose’
which would adversely affect Patient’s natural immune response). Let R be a variable that
takes value R = 1 if Patient recovers, R = 0 if she does not. Suppose that the context is such
that Doctor is equally disposed to each of the three courses of action. We can represent the
intentions of Doctor that give rise to this disposition using a variable D which takes value
D = 1 if Doctor has these intentions, and D = 0 if she does not. Suppose that Doctor in fact
administers two doses of Medicine, and Patient recovers.
Did Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine cause Patient to recover? I think the
natural reaction is one of ambivalence. After all, while it is true that Patient’s recovery was
more likely given that Doctor administered two doses than it would have been if she had
administered zero doses, it was less likely than if Doctor had administered one dose. If we
focus on the fact that Doctor could have administered just one dose, we might be inclined to
say that Patient recovered ‘despite’ Doctor’s action. If we focus on the fact that Doctor could
have administered zero doses, we might be inclined to say that Patient recovered ‘because of’
Doctor’s action. One plausible interpretation of our ambivalent attitude is that actual causation
is contrastive in nature, and ‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine caused Patient to
recover’ is ambiguous between ‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine rather than no
doses caused Patient to recover’ (to which most people would presumably assent) and
‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine rather than one dose caused Patient to
recover’ (to which most people would presumably not assent).
Yet, as it stands, PC delivers the unequivocal result that Doctor’s action (M = 2) was an
actual cause of Patient’s recovery (R = 1), where the variable set for our model is {D, M,R}.
To see this, let ~X = {M}, let ~x = {M = 2}, and let ϕ be R = 1. Consider the partition (~Z, ~W) of
the endogenous variables such that ~Z = 〈M,R〉 and ~W = ∅. Condition PC1 is satisfied because
M = 2 and R = 1 are the actual values of M and R (or rather the values that obtain in the world
in which our causal scenario plays out). If condition PC2 is satisfied, then condition PC3 is
satisfied because, if PC2(a) is satisfied, then this implies that the value of M makes a
probabilistic difference to that of R, and there are no (nonempty) subsets of {M}. Condition
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PC2(a) is satisfied because it requires only that there be one alternative value of M such that, if
M took that value (and the variables in ~W took some possible assignment ~W = ~w—something
that trivially holds because there are no variables in ~W in this case)47, then the probability of
R = 1 would be lower than if M had taken M = 2. In this case, M = 0 is such a value. So
PC2(a) is satisfied. Condition PC2(b) is rather trivially satisfied. Since there are no variables in
~Z\M,R, PC2(b) just reduces to the requirement that if M had taken the value M = 2, then the
probability of R = 1 would have been higher than it would have been if M had taken the value
M = 0, which clearly holds in the example given. So PC2 is satisfied. We have already seen
that PC1 is satisfied, and that PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is satisfied. Consequently, as it stands,
PC implies that Doctor’s action (M = 2) was an actual cause of Patient’s recovery (R = 1).
The unequivocal nature of PC’s verdict contrasts with the verdict of intuition, which is
equivocal. Thus, as was the case with AC, it would seem desirable to modify PC so that it can
capture the nuances of our contrastive causal judgements. This is easily achieved. To turn PC
into an analysis of ~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ being an actual cause of ϕ, we simply need to
require that PC2 hold, not just for some non-actual setting of ~X, but for precisely the setting
~X = ~x ′.
This revised version of PC yields the intuitively correct verdict that M = 2 rather than
M = 0 was an actual cause of R = 1. Specifically, taking the relevant contrast to M = 2 to be
M = 0, the revised version of PC is satisfied for precisely the same reason that taking ~X = ~x ′
to be M = 0 showed the original version of PC to be satisfied. The revised version of PC also
yields the verdict that M = 2 rather than M = 1 is not a cause of R = 1. This is because the
revised version of PC2(a) is violated when we take M = 1 to be the contrast to M = 2. This is
because it’s not the case that if M had taken the value M = 2, then the probability that R would
have taken R = 1 would have been higher than it would have been if M had taken the value
M = 1 (in fact it would have been lower in the example given). So the revised PC yields the
desired verdicts about these contrastive causal claims. Indeed, the revised PC can explain the
equivocality of intuition about the claim ‘M = 2 was an actual cause of R = 1’ in terms of its
47In what follows, I shall leave this parenthetical qualification implicit in all cases where ~W
is empty.
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ambiguity between ‘M = 2 rather than M = 0 was an actual cause of R = 1’ (which it
evaluates as true) and ‘M = 2 rather than M = 1 was an actual cause of R = 1 (which it
evaluates as false).
More generally, to turn PC into an analysis of ‘~X = ~x rather than ~X = ~x ′ is an actual cause
of ϕ’, where ~X = ~x ′ denotes a set of formulas of the form ~X = ~x ′, we simply need to require
that PC2 hold for every event of the form ~X = ~x ′ in ~X = ~x ′. This extension to allow for a
possibly non-singleton contrast set ~X = ~x ′ is particularly valuable when the putative cause
variable is many valued, or even continuous.
As an illustration, suppose that Driver is driving at 50 miles per hour (mph) and crashes.
Let S be a variable representing Driver’s speed in mph and let C be a variable that takes value
C = 1 if she crashes, and C = 0 if not. Suppose that B is a variable that represents the
dispositions of the driver, upon which her speed can be taken to depend. Suppose (for
simplicity) that the probability of Driver’s crashing is a strictly increasing function of her
speed, P(C = 1) = fP(C=1)(S ). Was Driver’s driving at 50mph an actual cause of her crash? I
think that it’s natural to feel ambivalent. There seems to me to be a strong temptation to say:
‘Driver’s driving at 50mph rather than less than 50mph was a cause of her crash’ but that
‘Driver’s driving at 50mph rather than more than 50mph was not a cause of her crash’. (We
might feel that it is appropriate to say that ‘Driver crashed despite driving at 50mph rather
than more than 50mph’.)
The revised version of PC, which allows for (non-singleton) contrast sets, can capture these
intuitions. It vindicates the assertion that Driver’s driving at 50mph rather than less than
50mph was a cause of her crash. In this case, the ‘rather than’ clause indicates that the contrast
set is to be taken as the set of all those possible values of S that are less than 50: that is, the set
{x : x ∈ R(S ), x < 50}, where R(S ) denotes the range of S (i.e. the set of all of S ’s possible
values). Suppose that our model has the variable set {B, S ,C}, let ~X = {S }, let ~x = {S = 50}, let
ϕ be C = 1, and let the partition (~Z, ~W) of the endogenous variables be the partition such that
~Z = 〈S ,C〉 and ~W = ∅. Condition PC1 is satisfied because S = 50 and C = 1 in the world in
question. Condition PC3 is satisfied if the revised condition PC2 is satisfied because the
satisfaction of the revised PC2(a) implies that S = 50 makes a difference (in the relevant
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circumstances, and relative to the appropriate contrast set) to the probability that C = 1, and
because there are no (non-empty) subsets of {S }. The revised condition PC2(a) is satisfied
because it is true that if S had taken S = 50, as it actually did, then the probability of C = 1
would have been higher than it would have been if S had taken any of the values in the set
{x : x ∈ R(S ), x < 50}. The revised condition PC2(b) is satisfied rather trivially because there
are no variables in ~Z\S ,C. So the revised PC2(b) just reduces to the requirement that if S had
taken the value S = 50, then the probability of C = 1 would have been higher than if S had
taken any value < 50. It was a stipulation of the example that this is the case. So PC2 is
satisfied. We have already seen that PC1 is satisfied, and that PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is. So the
revised version of PC yields the intuitively correct result that S = 50 rather than S < 50 was a
cause of C = 1.
The revised version of PC also vindicates the intuition that Driver’s driving at 50mph rather
than more than 50mph was not a cause of her crash. In this case the ‘rather than’ clause
indicates that the contrast set is to be taken to be that containing all those values of S that are
greater than 50: that is, {y : y ∈ R(S ), y > 50}. We can again take our model to have the
variable set {B, S ,C}, and we can again let ~X = {S }, ~x = {S = 50}, and let ϕ be C = 1. Again,
condition PC1 is satisfied because S = 50 and C = 1 in the world in question, and condition
PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is, for the same reasons as before. But, since the probability of C = 1 is
not higher given S = 50 than it would have been if S had taken any of the values in the set
{y : y ∈ R(S ), y > 50} (even if the variables in ~W—of which there are none—had taken some
set of possible values), the revised PC2(a) is not satisfied. The revised version of PC therefore
yields the intuitively correct result that S = 50 rather than S > 50 was not a cause of C = 1.
So the revised PC captures our intuitive judgements concerning contrastive causal claims in
this case.48 It also allows an explanation of why we feel ambivalent about the claim that
48Following Hitchcock ([2004], pp. 404–5), I also think that acknowledging the contrastive
nature of probabilistic causation is the correct way to deal with a well-known example of
probabilistic causation due to Rosen ([1978], pp. 607–8) and the similar examples that are
described in (Salmon [1984], pp. 194–201). Though, for reasons of space, I won’t
demonstrate of how the revised PC handles those examples here, the interested reader should
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‘Driver’s driving at 50mph was a cause of her crash’. The explanation is that this causal claim
is incomplete, since no contrast sets are specified. As such, the revised PC doesn’t yield a
verdict about whether this claim is true or false. In particular, the claim is ambiguous between
‘Driver’s driving at 50mph rather than less than 50mph caused her crash’ (which the revised
PC evaluates as true) and ‘Driver’s driving at 50mph rather than more than 50mph caused her
crash’ (which it evaluates as false).49
We have seen that building contrast into PC on the cause-side allows it to better capture our
intuitions. We may find it plausible to build contrast in on the effect-side too. To change our
earlier example involving Doctor and Patient somewhat, suppose (for simplicity) that Doctor
only has two options: to administer no dose of Medicine (M = 0) or to administer one dose of
Medicine (M = 1). In this case the variable M is thus binary. On the other hand, suppose this
time that the recovery variable R has three possible values: R = 0 if Patient fails to recover,
R = 1 if she recovers speedily, and R = 2 if she recovers slowly. Suppose, moreover, that the
probability distributions over the various values of R that would result from the various values
of M are those given in Table 1, where the probability values given are those that would result
for the various values of R specified in the top row if M had taken the various values specified
in the leftmost column.
have little trouble seeing how it does so, particularly in light of the discussion of Hitchcock
([2004], pp. 404–5).
49Of course, both in this case and in the medical case above, there are more than two
possible contrast sets that might be specified. Other contrast sets include {S = 25, S = 75} in
the driving example and {M = 0, M = 1} in the medical example. (The reader can verify that,
relative to these contrast sets the revised PC yields negative verdicts about actual causation in
the two cases.) So causal claims that fail to specify a contrast set are in fact multiply
ambiguous in these cases. In discussing the examples, I just picked out two particularly
interesting contrast sets.
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R = 0 R = 1 R = 2
M = 0 0.1 0.1 0.8
M = 1 0.1 0.8 0.1
Table 1: The probability value given in each cell c of the table is that which would obtain for the
value of R specified at the top of the column that c occupies if M had taken the value specified
at the left of the row that c occupies.
Suppose this time that Doctor in fact administers zero doses of Medicine (M = 0), and that
Patient recovers slowly (R = 2). We may well feel inclined to judge it to be false that Doctor’s
administering zero doses rather than one dose caused Patient to recover slowly rather than
not recovering at all, but true that Doctor’s administering zero doses rather than one dose
caused Patient to recover slowly rather than quickly. After all, Doctor’s administering zero
doses made no difference to the probability of Patient’s not recovering. However, it did make a
difference to the probability of Patient’s recovering quickly.
Analysis PC can be extended to achieve this result. Adapting a suggestion due to Schaffer
([2005], p. 348), I suggest that in order to analyse a claim of the form ‘~X = ~x rather than
~X = ~x ′ actually caused ϕ rather than ϕ′’ we simply need to (i) require that PC2 hold, not just
for some non-actual setting of ~X, but for precisely the setting ~X = ~x ′ (as discussed above); and
(ii) add the requirement that the resulting PC2(a) is also satisfied when we replace ~X = ~x with
~X = ~x ′ and vice versa, and replace ϕ with ϕ′, throughout. The upshot of all of this is that the
modified analysis requires not only that (in the circumstances ~W = ~w ′) the probability of ϕ is
higher in the presence of ~X = ~x than in the presence of ~X = ~x ′, but also that the probability of
the alternative ϕ′ would be higher in the presence of ~X = ~x ′ than in the presence of ~X = ~x.
This handles the present example. Suppose the endogenous variables in our model just to be
M and R, and let the partition (~Z, ~W) be the one such that ~Z = 〈M,R〉 and ~W = ∅. We get the
correct result that M = 0 rather than M = 1 was an actual cause of R = 2 rather than R = 1
because the probability of R = 2 would be higher if M took the value M = 0 than it would be
if M took the value M = 1 and the probability of R = 1 would be higher if M took the value
M = 1 than it would be if M took the value M = 0. We also get the correct result that M = 0
rather than M = 1 did not cause R = 2 rather than R = 0 because, while the probability of
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R = 2 would be higher if M took the value M = 0 than it would be if M took the value M = 1,
it is not the case that the probability of R = 0 would be higher if M took the value M = 1 than
it would be if M took the value M = 0.
More generally, suppose that we wish to analyse claims of the form ‘~X = ~x rather than
~X = ~x ′ was an actual cause of ϕ rather than ϕ′’, where ~X = ~x ′ denotes a set of formulas of the
form ~X = ~x ′ such that, for each such formula, ~x , ~x ′, and where ϕ′ represents a set of
formulas of the form ϕ′ such that, for each such formula, ϕ is incompatible with ϕ′. Then
(again adapting a proposal due to Schaffer [2005], p. 348) we need to require that, for each
event of the form ~X = ~x ′ in ~X = ~x ′, (i) PC2 holds, not just for some non-actual setting of ~X,
but for precisely the setting ~X = ~x ′; and (ii) there is some ϕ′ ∈ ϕ′ such that PC2(a) also holds
when we replace ~X = ~x with the specific setting ~X = ~x ′ and vice versa, and replace ϕ with ϕ′,
throughout.50 The upshot of all of this will be that the modified analysis requires not only that
(in the circumstances ~W = ~w ′) the probability of ϕ is higher in the presence of ~X = ~x than it is
in the presence of any formula of the form ~X = ~x ′ in ~X = ~x ′, but also that each formula of the
form ~X = ~x ′ in ~X = ~x ′ makes one of the alternatives ϕ′ in ϕ′ to ϕ more likely than does ~X = ~x.
This revised definition reduces to the original PC where the putative cause is a primitive
event (rather than a conjunction of primitive events) and where the putative effect is a
primitive event (rather than a Boolean combination of primitive events), and where the
variables representing cause and effect are binary. This was the case in our probabilistic
preemption scenario. For instance, consider the actual causal relation between C = 1
(Corleone’s order) and D = 1 (McCluskey’s death). In this case there is only one non-actual
possible value of the cause variable—namely, C = 0. This means that the non-actual setting of
the cause variable, ~X = ~x ′, appealed to in the unrevised condition PC2, can only be C = 0.
There is also only one non-actual possible value of the effect variable—namely, D = 0. This
means that the fact that C = 1 raised the probability of D = 1 (in the specified circumstances,
in which T = 0) automatically implies that C = 0 raised the probability of D = 0 (in those
50We might also require that for every ϕ′ ∈ ϕ′, there is some event of the form ~X = ~x ′ in
~X = ~x ′ such that (i) and (ii) hold with respect to precisely this ~X = ~x ′ and this ϕ′ (cf. Schaffer
[2005], p. 348).
62
same circumstances). Consequently, in this case, saying that C = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1
is effectively equivalent to saying that C = 1 rather than C = 0 is an actual cause of D = 1
rather than D = 0.
In closing this section, it is worth noting that, while the causal notion upon which I
(following Halpern and Pearl [2001], [2005]) have been focusing here is that of ‘actual
causation’, I think that other causal notions can be fruitfully analysed within the present
framework. I’m inclined to think that in the probabilistic case, just as in the deterministic case,
prevention is just the flip-side of actual causation: if ~X = ~x (rather than ~X = ~x ′) is an actual
cause of ϕ rather than ϕ′, then ~X = ~x (rather than ~X = ~x ′) prevents ϕ′ rather than ϕ from
happening.
There are other notions in the vicinity, such as ‘negative causal relevance’. For example,
concerning the driving case described above, we might well be inclined to say that Driver’s
driving at 50mph rather than over 50mph was negatively causally relevant to the crash. The
notion of ‘negative causal relevance’ seems to be different from the notion of prevention. It
would be clearly contradictory to say that ~X = ~x prevented ϕ51 but nevertheless ϕ obtained.
But it is not obviously contradictory to say that ~X = ~x was negatively relevant to ϕ, but ϕ
obtained. In such circumstances we might say things like ‘ϕ obtained despite ~X = ~x ’ (for
example: ‘the driver crashed despite driving at 50mph rather than over 50mph’). Likewise,
‘positive causal relevance’ seem to be different to actual causation. While it is contradictory to
say that ~X = ~x caused ϕ, but ϕ didn’t obtain, it does not seem contradictory to say that ~X = ~x
was positively relevant to ϕ, but ϕ didn’t obtain. In such cases we might say things like ‘ϕ
failed to occur despite ~X = ~x ’.
I suspect that talk of ‘positive causal relevance’ and ‘negative causal relevance’ is less well
regimented than talk of ‘causation’ and ‘prevention’. The use of SEMs and probabilistic
causal models allows us to distinguish a variety of precise causal notions (cf. Hitchcock
[2009], pp. 305–6; Hitchcock [2001b], esp. pp. 369–74) between which (I suspect) talk of
‘positive causal relevance’ and ‘negative causal relevance’ is ambiguous. In particular, in the
51For simplicity, here and in what follows, I drop reference to contrast sets where no
ambiguity will result.
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probabilistic context, saying that ~X = ~x is ‘positively causally relevant’ to ϕ may (I think)
mean any one of the following (and perhaps more besides): (a) ~X = ~x raises the probability of
ϕ (in a suitably non-backtracking way, such as that captured by inequality (1) in Section 6,
above); (b) ~X = ~x raises the probability of ϕ along one or more causal pathways (that is, when
variables on all other pathways are held fixed): essentially the notion that PC2(a) is designed
to capture (cf. Hitchcock [2001b], pp. 373–4); (c) ~X = ~x raises the probability of ϕ along a
causal pathway that represents a process that is complete except possibly for the effect itself
(which is essentially the notion that I take to be captured by the whole of PC, if one simply
drops the requirement that ϕ hold); or (d) ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ (which is the notion
that I take to be captured by the whole of PC).
Saying that ~X = ~x is ‘negatively causally relevant’ to ϕ may (I think) mean any one of the
following (and perhaps more besides): (a′) ~X = ~x lowers the probability of ϕ (in a suitably
non-backtracking way, such as that captured by inequality (1) if we were to replace the ‘>’
with a ‘<’); (b′) ~X = ~x lowers the probability of ϕ along one or more causal pathways (which
would be captured by PC2(a) if we replaced the ‘>’ with a ‘<’); (c′) ~X = ~x lowers the
probability of ϕ (raises the probability of ¬ϕ) along a causal pathway representing a process
that is complete except possibly that ϕ occurs (despite ~X = ~x) (which is essentially the notion
that I take to be captured by the whole of PC, if we were to replace the ‘>’s with ‘<’s and
drop the requirement that ϕ hold); (d′) ~X = ~x prevents ϕ (which I take to be captured by the
whole of PC if we were to replace the ‘>’s with ‘<’s and replace the requirement that ϕ hold
with the requirement that ¬ϕ hold); (e) ~X = ~x lowers the probability of ϕ (raises the
probability of ¬ϕ) along a causal pathway representing a process that is complete except that
ϕ does occur (despite ~X = ~x) (which is essentially the notion that I take to be captured by the
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whole of PC, if we were to replace the ‘>’s with ‘<’s52).53,54
In the next section, I will compare my analysis of probabilistic actual causation, PC, to an
analysis of probabilistic causation developed by Twardy and Korb ([2011]), which is similar
in spirit to my own. One difference between the two accounts is that Twardy and Korb
([2011], p. 906) advance their analysis as an analysis of ‘causal relevance’, rather than ‘actual
causation’. Although they don’t make this entirely explicit, I think the most natural reading of
what Twardy and Korb ([2011], pp. 902, 906) say indicates that, on their construal of ‘causal
relevance’, ~X = ~x is causally relevant to ϕ just in case either (d) or (e) holds. That is, just in
case ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ (a notion which—setting aside complications due to
contrastivity—I take to be captured by PC) or ~X = ~x lowers the probability of ϕ (raises the
probability of ¬ϕ) along a causal pathway representing a process that is complete except that
ϕ does occur (despite ~X = ~x) (which is essentially the notion that I take to be captured by the
whole of PC, if we were to replace the ‘>’s with ‘<’s).
I have focused on actual causation, which has the occurrence of the putative effect event
caused as a necessary condition (and, as a corollary, prevention, which has the non-occurrence
of the prevented event as a necessary condition), not because I don’t think that the present
52In fact, a further adjustment to PC would be needed to capture (e): specifically one would
have to limit the subsets ~Z′ of ~Z appealed to in PC2(b) to those subsets that don’t include
variables that figure in ϕ. I will leave this qualification implicit from now on.
53Although I take (e) to capture one notion of ‘negative causal relevance’, I don’t think that
there is an analogous sense in which ‘positive causal relevance’ is used: that is, I don’t think
that we would ever take ‘~X = ~x is positively causally relevant to ϕ’ to mean: (e′) ~X = ~x raises
the probability of ϕ along a causal pathway representing a process that is complete except ¬ϕ
holds. (Though we might mean (c)—see the main text above—which is similar.)
54Note that on some disambiguations of these notions (e.g. (c) and (c′)), ~X = ~x being
positively causally relevant to ϕ isn’t incompatible with ~X = ~x also being negatively causally
relevant to ϕ (cf. Hitchcock [2001b], p. 370). By contrast, ‘~X = ~x caused ϕ’ and ‘~X = ~x
prevented ϕ’ are incompatible (because the former implies that ϕ holds, whereas the latter
implies that ϕ doesn’t hold).
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approach can distinguish a number of interesting causal notions (It can!), but because, firstly,
actual causation is one causal notion of particular interest. For example, actual causation is
particularly central to scientific explanation (especially when contrasted with notions such as
probability raising, or probability-raising-along-a-pathway, where it is not required that there
be a complete causal process connecting the probability raiser to the probability raisee).
Second and (presumably) relatedly, as I have suggested, our talk of ‘causation’ (and
‘prevention’) is (I think) better regimented than our use of other causal notions—such as
‘causal relevance’—thus making it possible to use our causal talk to triangulate to a particular
causal notion that can be precisely defined in terms of causal models. Nevertheless, I am very
sympathetic to those who use the causal modelling framework to distinguish other interesting
causal notions. Indeed, I have indicated in the previous three paragraphs how I would go about
analyzing several such notions, including the one that Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 906) call
‘causal relevance’.
9 Twardy and Korb’s Account
A similar project to my own—namely that of extending deterministic structural equations
accounts of causation to the probabilistic context—has recently been pursued (independently)
by Twardy and Korb ([2011]). Their account has some similarities to mine (hopefully
reflecting a ‘convergence to the truth’!), but also differs in important respects. These
differences leave their account susceptible to counterexamples that mine avoids.
One difference (which I take to be unproblematic) is that Twardy and Korb’s analogue of
my condition PC2(a) (and Halpern and Pearl’s AC2(a))55 appeals to contingent probabilistic
difference-making (i.e. contingent probability-raising or contingent probability-lowering). So,
in essence, their version of my PC2(a) can be arrived at just by replacing > with ,. As they
indicate (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 906), this reflects the fact that they wish to analyse a
somewhat broader notion than that of ‘actual causation’: namely that of ‘causal relevance’.
55Since nothing in the following discussion of Twardy and Korb’s account turns on issues of
contrastivity, I compare their account with the original (non-contrastive) definitions AC and
PC for simplicity.
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For reasons discussed at the end of the previous section, I am confining my attention to actual
causation (and, as a corollary, prevention). It seems to me that contingent probability-raising
is the relation that we need to focus upon in analyzing actual causation, while contingent
probability-lowering is important in the analysis of prevention. Twardy and Korb ([2011] p.
906) appear to agree that contingent probability-lowering is the relation of relevance to
analyzing prevention. They (Twardy and Korb [2011] p. 906) suggest that contingent
probability-raising is of relevance to analyzing ‘promotion’, though they do not make it
entirely clear what they take the relation between ‘promotion’ and actual causation to be.
In fact, as I suggested at the end of the previous section, the notion of ‘causal relevance’
that I take Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 906) to be seeking to analyse can be understood as a
disjunction: ~X = ~x is causally relevant to ϕ if and only if either ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ (a
notion which I take to be captured by PC) or ~X = ~x lowers the probability of ϕ (raises the
probability of ¬ϕ) along a causal pathway representing a process that is complete except that
ϕ occurs (despite ~X = ~x) (a notion that I take essentially to be captured by the whole of PC, if
we replace the ‘>’s with ‘<’s). So, in addition to incorporating into their analysis a condition
that is similar to PC2(a), but which appeals to contingent probabilistic difference-making
rather than contingent probability-raising (that is, which makes use of ‘,’s rather than ‘>’s),
Twardy and Korb also need a condition which captures the notion of a complete causal
process from ~X = ~x to ϕ. In Halpern and Pearl’s account, this ‘complete causal process’
requirement is captured by AC2(b). My proposed generalization of AC2(b) to the probabilistic
case is PC2(b). Twardy and Korb propose a different generalization of AC2(b) to the
probabilistic case. They present two conditions to replace AC2(b).
As noted, the purpose of both AC2(b) and PC2(b) is to ensure that the causal process
connecting the putative cause ~X = ~x to the effect ϕ is complete. In the case of AC2(b), this is
achieved by requiring that ϕ would hold (in circumstances ~W = ~w ′) if ~X = ~x held and any
subset ~Z′ of the variables ~Z representing the ‘active causal process’ from ~X = ~x to ϕ took their
actual values ~Z′ = ~z ∗. In the case of PC2(b), it is achieved by requiring that if ~X = ~x held and
any subset ~Z′ of the variables ~Z took their actual values ~Z′ = ~z ∗ (in circumstances ~W = ~w ′),
then the probability of ϕ would be higher than if ~X simply took the alternative value ~X = ~x ′ (in
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circumstances ~W = ~w ′).
The analogue to AC2(b) proposed by Twardy and Korb ([2011]) is markedly different. They
do not appeal to what would happen, or what the probabilities would be, if any subset ~Z′ of the
variables ~Z representing the ‘active causal process’ from ~X = ~x to ϕ took their actual values
~Z′ = ~z ∗ (due to interventions or the like). Instead, they appeal to the notion of a ‘soft
intervention’ (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 907), where the latter (in contrast to the ‘hard’
interventions that can be taken to be represented by expressions of the form do(~X = ~x)) don’t
fix the value of the variable intervened upon, but rather fix a probability distribution for the
variable intervened upon. Their idea is that, rather than considering what would happen, or
what the probabilities would be, if subsets ~Z′ of variables in ~Z took their actual values ~Z′ = ~z ∗
(due to hard interventions), we should instead consider what the probabilities would be if
subsets ~Z′ of variables in ~Z took their original probability distributions (due to soft
interventions) (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 907).
Adapting the notation of Godszmidt and Pearl ([1992]) to the case of soft interventions, let
do(P(~Z′) = P(~Z′|do(~X = ~x))) represent a ‘soft’ intervention that sets the probability
distribution over variables in ~Z′ to that distribution which would obtain if the variables ~X were
to take the values ~X = ~x as a result of hard interventions (or local surgeries or small miracles).
Then, some less important and some purely notational differences aside, the proposal made by
Twardy and Korb ([2011], pp. 906–8) is that, in the probabilistic context, Halpern and Pearl’s
AC2 be replaced (not by my PC2) but by the following:
PC2∗ There exists a partition (~Z, ~W) of Y (i.e. the set of endogenous variables in the model
M∗) with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x ′, ~w ′) of the variables in (~X, ~W) such that the
following holds:
(a) P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x& ~W = ~w ′)) , P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x ′& ~W = ~w ′)). In words, if the variables
in ~W had taken the values ~W = ~w ′, then the probability of ϕ would be different if
the variables in ~X took their actual values ~X = ~x than if the variables in ~X took the
values ~X = ~x ′.
(b) P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x& ~W = ~w)) = P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x& ~W = ~w ′)), where ~W = ~w are the actual
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values of ~W. In words, if the variables in ~X had taken their actual values ~X = ~x,
then the probability of ϕ would have been no different if the variables in ~W had
taken their actual values ~W = ~w than if they had taken the values ~W = ~w ′.
(c) P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x& ~W = ~w ′&P(~Z′) = P(~Z′|do(~X = ~x))) = P(ϕ|do(~X = ~x& ~W = ~w ′)) for
all subsets ~Z′ of ~Z\{~X, ϕ}. In words, if the variables in ~X had taken their actual
values ~X = ~x and the variables in ~W had taken the values ~W = ~w ′, then the
probability of ϕ would be no different if additionally the probability distribution
over any arbitrary subset of the variables in ~Z (excluding those represented in ~X or
ϕ) had (due to a soft intervention) been the same as it would be if merely ~X = ~x.
Since Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 902) only make provision for primitive events to act as
cause and effect (thus effectively requiring that ~X = ~x and ϕ stand for primitive events, rather
than potentially standing respectively for conjunctions, or for Boolean combinations, of
primitive events), they don’t need a minimality condition analogous to Halpern and Pearl’s
AC3 or my PC3. They do, however, incorporate the requirement that both X = x and Y = y be
actual if X = x is to count as ‘causally relevant’ to Y = y in the sense that they wish to analyse
(Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 902). Consequently, they effectively replicate condition PC1.
Thus, if we limit our attention to causation between primitive events, it is PC2∗ (most
significantly, PC2∗(b) and PC2∗(c)) that differentiates Twardy and Korb’s account from my
own.
Twardy and Korb’s account yields the correct verdicts concerning the probabilistic
preemption case described in Section 6 above. Specifically, PC2∗(a) is satisfied when we let
~X = {C}, ~x = {C = 1}, and when we let ϕ be D = 1. For let ~W = 〈B,T 〉, ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0},
and ~Z = 〈C, S ,D〉. Condition PC2∗(a) is satisfied because if B = 1 and T = 0 and C = 1, then
the probability of D = 1 would have been approximately 0.45, whereas if B = 1 and T = 0 and
C = 0, then the probability of D = 1 would have been approximately 0.56 Condition PC2∗(b)
56As usual it is important that the foregoing counterfactuals are evaluated with respect to
worlds in which the variables—in particular, T—have the specified values as a result of (hard)
interventions, or the like. Again, this is what the do(·) operator indicates.
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is trivially satisfied, since ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0} are the actual values of ~W = 〈B,T 〉. Finally,
PC2∗(c) is satisfied because interventions on the values of B and T do not make a difference to
the probability of S . This means that, if C = 1 and B = 1 and T = 0, a soft intervention setting
the probability that S = 1 to the value that it would have had if merely C = 1 (and ~W = 〈B,T 〉
had not been forced to take ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0} by hard interventions) in fact makes no
difference to the probability of S = 1 at all (it remains at 0.9). Consequently (when C = 1 and
B = 1 and T = 0), setting the probability that S = 1 to this value makes no difference to the
probability that D = 1 (which remains approximately 0.9 × 0.5 = 0.45). So PC2∗(c), in
addition to PC2∗(a) and PC2∗(b), is satisfied when we consider C = 1 as a potential cause of
D = 1. Since it is also the case that C = 1 and D = 1 are the actual values of C and D (in the
world in which this causal scenario plays out), Twardy and Korb’s account yields the correct
result that C = 1 is a cause of D = 1.
It also yields the correct result that B = 1 is not a cause of D = 1. To see this, observe the
following. Condition PC2∗(a) is satisfied when we let ~X = {B}, ~x = {B = 1}, and we let ϕ be
D = 1. For let ~W = 〈C, S 〉, ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 0}, and ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉. If C = 1 and S = 0 and
B = 1, then the probability of D = 1 would have been approximately 0.81, but if C = 1 and
S = 0 and B = 0, then the probability of D = 1 would have been approximately 0. So PC2∗(a)
is satisfied. However, PC2∗(b) is violated. After all, if B = 1 and the variables ~W = 〈C, S 〉 had
taken their actual values ~w = {C = 1, S = 1} then the probability of D = 1 would have been
approximately 0.5, which is different from the probability that D = 1 if B = 1, C = 1, and
S = 0 (which is approximately 0.81).
Could we instead let ~w ′ be the actual values of ~W = 〈C, S 〉: that is, let ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 1}?
Perhaps we could argue that PC2∗(a) is still satisfied: that if C = 1 and S = 1 and B = 1, then
the probability of D = 1 would have been different than if C = 1 and S = 1 and B = 0. This
will be so if, in the case where Barzini issues his order and Sonny shoots, there’s still some
(albeit small) chance of Turk shooting too (and if it’s the case that, if they both shoot, then the
probability of McCluskey’s death is different than if Sonny shoots alone). This chance—the
chance that Turk would also shoot if Sonny shot and Barzini issued his order—is of course
lower than the chance that Turk would shoot if Barzini issued his order (and no intervention
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on whether Sonny shoots occurrs), which is approximately 0.09 (remember: Corleone’s order
is implicitly held fixed by a suitable semantics for this counterfactual). After all, in the
example, Sonny’s shooting lowers the probability of Turk’s shooting.
Condition PC2∗(b) is now trivially satisfied, since ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 1} are the actual values
of ~W = 〈C, S 〉. But PC2∗(c) is now violated for, if B = 1, C = 1, and S = 1, then if T = 1 were,
due to a soft intervention, to take the value if would have received if simply B took B = 1 due
to a (hard) intervention (and the values of C and S were not intervened upon)—namely,
approximately 0.09—then the probability of D = 1 would be different (higher) than it would
be if merely (due to hard interventions) B = 1, C = 1, and S = 1 (and the probability of T = 1
took the lower value, of close to 0, that it would receive without this soft intervention).
So it seems that, where we consider B = 1 as a potential cause of D = 1, either PC2∗(b) or
PC2∗(c) is violated (depending on how we assign values to ~W). So Twardy and Korb’s
analysis correctly diagnoses B = 1 as a non-cause of D = 1.
In the next section, I will describe two examples that my account, PC, can handle, the first
of which shows that Twardy and Korb’s account doesn’t provide a sufficient condition for
actual causation, the second of which shows that it doesn’t provide a necessary condition.
Since they advance their account as an analysis of ‘causal relevance’ rather than ‘actual
causation’, these needn’t be taken to show that Twardy and Korb’s account doesn’t succeed as
an analysis of its own target notion. However, the examples do show that their account as it
stands can’t be taken to provide an adequate analysis of actual causation. They also serve to
further illustrate the virtues of the analysis of actual causation developed here, which correctly
handles the examples.
It should, however, be noted that, although Twardy and Korb don’t make fully explicit the
relationship between actual causation and the notion of ‘causal relevance’ that they seek to
analyse, it does in fact appear (as I have noted) that they take actual causation to be a special
case of causal relevance (Twardy and Korb [2011], pp. 902, 906), with the other case being
that in which the causally relevant factor, ~X = ~x, lowers the probability of the factor ϕ that it is
causally relevant to (thus raising the probability of ¬ϕ) along a causal pathway representing a
process that is complete (except that ϕ holds rather than ¬ϕ). Importantly, both cases require a
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causal process from ~X = ~x to ϕ that is complete (except, in the second case, that the obtaining
of ϕ itself might be taken to constitute an incompleteness). On Twardy and Korb’s account, it
is PC2∗(b) and PC2∗(c) that are intended to capture the requirement that the causal process be
complete. On my account, by contrast, PC2(b) plays the role of ensuring a complete causal
process from ~X = ~x to ϕ. But the examples that I give in the next section show precisely that
the conjunction of PC2∗(b) and PC2∗(c) is not necessary or sufficient to capture the
requirement that a causal process be complete, whereas PC2(b) is necessary and sufficient. (It
is thus worth noting that the examples that I will present do not trade on the difference
between my PC2(a) and Twardy and Korb’s PC2∗(a): that is, they do not trade upon the fact
that my account appeals to contingent probability-raising, whereas theirs appeals to contingent
probabilistic difference-making.) So in fact I do think that the examples that I shall present are
counterexamples to the analysis of Twardy and Korb, even when that analysis is taken on its
own terms, as an analysis of a more inclusive notion than that of actual causation.
10 Probabilistic Fizzling
In our probabilistic preemption case, the reason that the ‘backup’ process initiated by
Barzini’s order didn’t run to completion (in that Turk did not shoot McCluskey) can be
explained in terms of the fact that Sonny shot before Turk arrived at the scene, thus greatly
reducing the chance of Turk’s shooting McCluskey (a case of probabilistic prevention). This is
strongly analogous to the deterministic preemption case in which Sonny’s shooting
deterministically prevents Turk from shooting.
However, probabilistic processes (such as that initiated by Barzini’s order in the
probabilistic version of our preemption scenario) do not need to be ‘interrupted’ by other
processes (such as that initiated by Corleone’s order) in order for them to fail to run to
completion. Because such processes are probabilistic, they may—to adopt the terminology of
Schaffer ([2001], p. 91)—simply ‘fizzle out’ as a matter of probability.
Consider a modified version of our probabilistic pre-emption example which is exactly as
before (in that all of the probabilities are the same, and both Barzini and Corleone issue their
orders) except that, as a matter of chance, Sonny doesn’t shoot (recall that, in the original
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probabilistic example, there was a 0.1 chance of his not shooting, given Corleone’s order).
Suppose that, in spite of Sonny’s not shooting, and again as a matter of chance, Turk doesn’t
shoot either (there was a 0.1 chance of Turk’s not shooting given Barzini’s order and Sonny’s
not shooting). Finally, as a matter of (very small) chance, McCluskey dies anyway (of an
unrelated heart attack57).
In this case, both the process initiated by Corleone’s order, and the process initiated by
Barzini’s order, simply ‘fizzle out’ as a matter of probability before they can run to completion
and cause McCluskey’s death. To use Schaffer’s terminology again, we can regard Turk’s
failure to shoot as the ‘fizzling’ event (Schaffer [2001], p. 81) or (for short) ‘fizzler’ (Schaffer
[2001], p. 81) on the Barzini-process, and Sonny’s failure to shoot as the ‘fizzler’ on the
Corleone-process.
Intuitively, in this revised scenario, neither Corleone’s nor Barzini’s order was an actual
cause of McCluskey’s death. Yet, just as before, both bear the contingent probability-raising
relations to it required by PC2(a). Specifically, the relevant inequalities (8) and (10) (see
Section 8, above) continue to obtain.
Still, PC correctly diagnoses both Corleone’s order and Barzini’s order as non-causes. This
is because PC2(b) is violated in each case. In the case of Barzini’s order, it is violated for
exactly the same reason as before: namely because inequality (11) (see Section 8, above)
continues to hold in this version of the example, with the (‘fizzling’) value T = 0 (representing
Turk’s non-shooting) still being the actual value of T .
But in this case PC2(b) is also violated when we consider Corleone’s order as a putative
actual cause of McCluskey’s death. For let ~W = 〈B,T 〉, ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0}, ~Z = 〈C, S ,D〉,
and ~Z′ = {S } ⊂ ~Z, and note that the following inequality holds:
57In the original example, it was (for calculational simplicity) stated that the chance of such
an event was ‘negligible’, but not that it was 0. Furthermore, we could stipulate a
non-negligible probability of such an event without changing the basic structure of the
example.
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P(D = 1|do(C = 1&B = 1&T = 0&S = 0)) ≤ P(D = 1|do(C = 0&B = 1&T = 0)) (12)
That is, if B = 1 and T = 0 and C = 1 and S took its actual value, which is now S = 0, then
the probability of D = 1 would have been no higher than it would have been if B = 1 and
T = 0 and C = 0. Or, in other words, where Barzini issues his order but Turk doesn’t shoot,
the probability of McCluskey’s dying if Corleone issues his order but Sonny doesn’t shoot, is
no higher than it would have been if Corleone hadn’t issued his order in the first place. Since
PC2(b) is violated in this variant of the example when we consider C = 1 as a putative actual
cause of D = 1, PC correctly does not count C = 1 as an actual cause of D = 1 in this case.
By contrast, though Twardy and Korb’s account counts Barzini’s order as causally
irrelevant to McCluskey’s dying in this case, it counts Corleone’s order as causally relevant to
McCluskey’s dying. To see that it counts Barzini’s order as causally irrelevant, let ~X = {B},
~x = {B = 1}, and let ϕ be D = 1. Let ~W = 〈C, S 〉, ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 0}, and ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉.
Condition PC2∗(a) is satisfied because inequality (10) from Section 8 above continues to hold
in this version of the example. Condition PC2∗(b) is satisfied trivially, because {C = 1, S = 0}
are the actual values of C and S in this version of the example. But PC2∗(c) is violated for, if
B = 1, C = 1, and S = 0, and if the probability of T = 1 were, due to a soft intervention, to
take the value that it would have received if simply B took B = 1 due to a (hard) intervention
(and the values of C and S were not intervened upon)—namely, approximately 0.09—then the
probability of D = 1 would have been approximately 0.081. This is different than the
probability for D = 1 that would have obtained if (due to hard interventions) B = 1, C = 1,
and S = 0 (and there were no soft intervention on the probability of T = 1), which would have
been approximately 0.81.
Could we instead let ~w ′ be ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 1}? Perhaps we could argue that PC2∗(a) is
still satisfied if we do so: that is, we could perhaps argue that if C = 1 and S = 1 and B = 1,
then the probability of D = 1 would have been different than if C = 1 and S = 1 and B = 0.
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This will be so if, in the case where Barzini issues his order and Sonny shoots, there’s still
some (albeit small) chance of Turk shooting too (and if it’s the case that, if they both shoot,
then the probability of McCluskey’s death is different than if Sonny shoots alone). The trouble
is that PC2∗(b) is now violated. After all, if B = 1 and the variables ~W = 〈C, S 〉 had taken the
values that they actually have (in the version of the example presently under consideration),
~w = {C = 1, S = 0}, then the probability of D = 1 would have been approximately 0.81, which
is different from the probability that D = 1 would have had if B = 1, C = 1, and S = 1, which
is approximately 0.5.
So it seems that, where we consider B = 1 as a potential cause of D = 1, either PC2∗(b) or
PC2∗(c) is violated (depending on how we assign values to ~W = 〈C, S 〉). So Twardy and
Korb’s analysis (correctly) diagnoses B = 1 as causally irrelevant to D = 1 in this case.
To see that Twardy and Korb’s analysis (incorrectly) diagnoses C = 1 as causally relevant
to D = 1 in this case, note that PC2∗(a) is satisfied when we let ~X = {C}, ~x = {C = 1}, and
when we let ϕ be D = 1. For let ~W = 〈B,T 〉, ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0}, and ~Z = 〈C, S ,D〉. Then
condition PC2∗(a) is satisfied in virtue of the fact that inequality (8) (from Section 8, above)
continues to hold. Condition PC2∗(b) is trivially satisfied, since ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0} are the
actual values of ~W = 〈B,T 〉. Finally, PC2∗(c) is satisfied because the values of B and T are
(when set by interventions) probabilistically irrelevant to that of S . This means that, if C takes
its actual value C = 1, while ~W = 〈B,T 〉 take (due to interventions) the values
~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0}, then a soft intervention changing the probability that S = 1 back to the
value that it would have if C took C = 1 (without the additional assumption that, due to
interventions, ~W = 〈B,T 〉 took ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0}) doesn’t in fact change the probability of
S = 1 at all (it remains at 0.9 either way). Consequently, given C = 1, B = 1, and T = 0,
whether or not this soft intervention occurs makes no difference to the probability of D = 1
(either way, it is approximately 0.9 × 0.5 = 0.45). Condition PC2∗(c) is thus satisfied. So
condition PC2∗ is satisfied. And, since C = 1 and D = 1 are the actual values of C and D in
this version of the example, Twardy and Korb’s account thus yields the result that C = 1 is
causally relevant to D = 1 in this case.
Since, as I read them, Twardy and Korb take causal relevance involving contingent
75
probability-raising, as opposed to contingent probability-lowering, to imply actual causation
(that is, they take the satisfaction of PC2∗(b) and PC2∗(c) together with the satisfaction of the
condition that results from substituting , with > rather than with < in PC2∗(a) to be sufficient
for actual causation), this result appears to be one that is incorrect by their lights.58 More
importantly for my purposes, it also shows that replacing my condition PC2(b) with their
conditions PC2∗(b) and PC2∗(c) in the analysis PC would result in a set of conditions that was
no longer sufficient for actual causation.
The reasoning that shows that Twardy and Korb’s account (incorrectly) counts C = 1 as
causally relevant to D = 1 in the most recent, fizzling, example is exactly the same as the
reasoning that shows that it (correctly) counts C = 1 as causally relevant to D = 1 in the
original probabilistic pre-emption scenario. This shows that Twardy and Korb’s account,
unlike the account proposed here, isn’t sufficiently sensitive to whether putative cause and
effect are connected by a complete causal process to ensure that non-causes are always
correctly diagnosed as such.
The example just considered shows that Twardy and Korb’s account (unlike PC) doesn’t
constitute a sufficient condition for actual causation. A further variant on our probabilistic
preemption scenario shows that it doesn’t constitute a necessary condition either. Suppose,
this time, that things are exactly as before (in that all of the probabilities are the same as in the
original probabilistic preemption scenario, and both Barzini and Corleone issue their orders)
and that (as in the ‘fizzling’ example described at the beginning of this section), as a matter of
chance, Sonny doesn’t shoot (S = 0). But suppose that, this time, and again as a matter of
chance, Turk does shoot (T = 1), and Turk’s bullet hits and kills McCluskey.
My proposed definition, PC, yields the correct results about this latest case. C = 1 is
correctly counted as a non-cause of D = 1. To see this, let ~W = 〈B,T 〉, ~w ′ = {B = 1,T = 0},
~Z = 〈C, S ,D〉, and ~Z′ = {S } ⊂ ~Z. Condition PC2(a) is satisfied because inequality (8) (from
58Indeed, even if I am mistaken about how they view the relation between causal relevance
and actual causation, this example appears to create problems for them, since their account
yields an asymmetry in the causal status of C = 1 and B = 1 with respect to D = 1 in this case:
yet it seems that either both or neither should count as causally relevant to D = 1.
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Section 8, above) still holds in this latest version of the example. But condition PC2(b) is
violated because inequality (12) (this section, above) holds, and S = 0 is the actual value of S
in this case.
On the other hand, my proposed definition, PC, correctly counts B = 1 as an actual cause of
D = 1 in this case. To see this, let ~W = 〈C, S 〉, ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 0}, and ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉.
Condition PC2(a) is satisfied because inequality (10) (Section 8, above) holds. Condition
PC2(b) is also satisfied because the probability of D = 1 is higher when B = 1, C = 1, S = 0,
and arbitrary subsets of ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉 take their actual values, than it is when B = 0, C = 1,
and S = 0. In particular consider ~Z′ = {T } ⊂ ~Z. The actual value of T in this version of the
scenario is T = 1, and note that:
P(D = 1|do(B = 1&C = 1&S = 0&T = 1)) > P(D = 1|do(B = 0&C = 1&S = 0)) (13)
The term on the left-hand side of this inequality is approximately equal to 0.9, while the term
on the right-hand side is approximately equal to 0. Clearly we could remove T = 1 and/or add
D = 1 and/or (another iteration of) B = 1 within the scope of the do(·) operator in the
probability expression that appears on the left-hand side of this inequality without affecting
the fact that the inequality holds. It thus holds when we include the actual values of arbitrary
subsets of ~Z within the scope of the do(·) operator on the left-hand side, as PC2(b) requires.
So PC2(b) holds, and PC consequently correctly diagnoses B = 1 as an actual cause of D = 1
in this version of the scenario.
Twardy and Korb’s account, by contrast, classifies B = 1 as not causally relevant to D = 1.
To see this note that PC2∗(a) is satisfied when we let ~X = {B}, ~x = {B = 1}, and when ϕ is
D = 1. For let ~W = 〈C, S 〉, ~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 0}, and let ~Z = 〈B,T,D〉. Then PC2∗(a) is
satisfied because inequality (10) (from Section 8, above) continues to hold in this variant of
the example. Condition PC2∗(b) is also trivially satisfied, since in this variant of the example
~w ′ = {C = 1, S = 0} are the actual values of ~W = 〈C, S 〉. But PC2∗(c) is violated for, if B = 1,
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C = 1, and S = 0, then the probability of T = 1 is 0.9, and the probability of D = 1 is
approximately 0.81. But if B = 1, C = 1, and S = 0 and the probability of T = 1 were (due to
a soft intervention) to take the value that it receives if we simply set B = 1 and perform no
further interventions, which is approximately 0.09, then the probability that D = 1 would be
significantly lower (approximately 0.081). So, where we consider B = 1 as potentially
causally relevant to D = 1, PC2∗(c) is violated. So Twardy and Korb’s analysis classifies
B = 1 as not causally relevant D = 1 in this scenario. I take it that this classification is
incorrect, since I take it that the fact that B = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1 (which it intuitively
is in this case) is sufficient for B = 1 to count as causally relevant to D = 1.
The reasoning that shows that Twardy and Korb’s account (incorrectly) counts B = 1 as
causally irrelevant to D = 1 in the most recent example (in which, actually, T = 1) is exactly
the same as the reasoning that shows that it (correctly) counts B = 1 as causally irrelevant to
D = 1 in the previous example (in which, actually, T = 0). The reason that Twardy and Korb’s
account goes wrong is once again that, unlike my account, their account tests what the
probability of the putative effect would be, not if the variables on the active causal process
took their actual values (while ~X takes ~X = ~x and ~W takes ~W = ~w ′), but if these variables took
their actual probability distributions (while ~X takes ~X = ~x and ~W takes ~W = ~w ′). This means
that their account isn’t sufficiently sensitive to whether putative cause and effect are connected
by a complete causal process.59
In fairness to Twardy and Korb, they do claim (Twardy and Korb [2011], pp. 900, 912) that
a complete account of actual causation will require the structural equations/probabilistic causal
models framework to be supplemented with an account of the metaphysics of causal processes
(see also Handfield et al. [2008]). However, in (Twardy and Korb [2011]) their stated aim is to
“push stochastic causal models as far as they can go alone” (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 900).
59This fact also underlies the rather counterintuitive verdict that Twardy and Korb’s account
yields concerning the ‘Stochastic Assassin’ case that they discuss (Twardy and Korb [2011],
pp. 909–11). Though I shall not show it here, the interested reader can verify that the analysis
that I have proposed (namely, PC), unlike Twardy and Korb’s analysis, yields the expected
result about the causal status of the event ‘Supervisor’s aiming’ in that example.
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My claim is that the analysis suggested here pushes them further than does Twardy and Korb’s
analysis and in doing so better captures, within a probabilistic causal modeling framework, the
intuition that cause and effect must be linked by a complete causal process.
11 Conclusion
It has been shown that Halpern and Pearl’s definition of ‘actual cause’ admits of a natural
extension to the probabilistic case. The probabilistic rendering that I have proposed elegantly
handles cases of probabilistic pre-emption, as well as cases of ‘fizzling’. The latter cases are
incorrectly diagnosed by the account of Twardy and Korb ([2011]), which in other respects is
the probabilistic account of causation that is most similar to that proposed here. Though a
survey of how my account handles the full battery of problem cases against which analyses of
actual causation are tested is beyond the scope of this essay, the fact that Halpern and Pearl
have shown that their analysis of deterministic actual causation is able to handle a large range
of deterministic cases lends at least some plausibility to the conjecture that the probabilistic
analogue of their definition developed here may have success in handling the probabilistic
variants of such cases. Further credence is lent to this conjecture by the fact that Twardy and
Korb ([2011], [unpublished]) have shown that their account, which bears similarities to mine
(except in its handling of fizzling), is able to handle a number of such cases.
In addition to applying the analysis developed here to a greater range of test cases, it will
also be worth exploring whether the refinement added to Halpern and Pearl’s account in later
papers by Halpern ([2008]) and Halpern and Hitchcock ([2010], [forthcoming])—namely the
incorporation of normality considerations—which is designed to enable the account to handle
a still greater range of problem cases, can and should be adapted to this proposed probabilistic
extension of the analysis. I look forward to pursuing both of these lines of investigation in
future work.
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